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AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
Mariano-Florentino Cugllar*
Executive branch officials routinely make thousands of decisions affect-
ing public security and welfare. While it is rare that such discretionary deci-
sions are entirely immune from some kind of judicial review, the courts' role
is often so circumscribed or deferential that in some domains the probability
of uncovering problems through such review almost certainly falls close to
zero. The resulting amount of executive discretion carries considerable risks
along with rewards. Some discretionary decisions undoubtedly benefit from
the speed and flexibility associated with limits on judicial review. Yet judi-
cial review's evisceration as a tool to restrain certain forms of discretion also
makes it easier for some officials to promote appealing political impressions by
subtly manipulating decisions, for others to engage in outright malfeasance,
and for still others to simply fail to correct mistakes. Reliance on judicial
review to generate information about executive discretion makes it difficult to
address these concerns because courts routinely define much of their work in
terms of applying the same standard of deference to every case in a particular
class, limiting possibilities to increase the stringency of review in some policy
domains without making the costs allegedly prohibitive. As a conceptual
alternative for monitoring executive discretion, this Article develops a frame-
work akin to that employed by courts engaged in the "sample adjudication"
of class action and government fraud cases. It relies on the possibility of
systematically auditing samples of discretionary decisions and making those
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results public. Although the efficacy of such a system depends on the political
context and details of its institutional design, audits have the potential to
sever the connection between the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion
and the stringency of review. They also avoid the potentially distorted picture
of bureaucratic activity created by a litigation-driven process. Despite their
value, such audits are nonetheless almost never undertaken by existing fed-
eral audit bureaucracies, nor does the legislature seem to conduct them in
connection with oversight hearings. This Article discusses the dynamics
working against these audits, explains how auditing may nonetheless occa-
sionally prove t( be politically viable, and concludes by emphasizing the im-
portance of greater sensitivity to institutional complexities in recurring
debates about the merits of executive discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
The problem is a familiar one. Most laws are enforced to some
degree by executive bureaucracies. No legal system can ever vanquish
their discretion. Even if doing so were possible, it would be madness
to squeeze out every last drop of human judgment from the law's ap-
plication. Then again, too much discretion breeds its own madness.
Sensitive to this predicament, legislators and judges subject a range of
government activities to elaborate legal constraints.1 Procedural for-
malities and external court review-ostensibly designed to balance the
risks and rewards of lodging public power in bureaucratic organiza-
tions-therefore epitomize familiar legal tasks such as criminal trials
and regulatory rulemaking proceedings.
But not every task. Despite the presence of these constraints in
some domains, 2 the hallmark of many executive decisions often
1 For insightful discussions of how concerns about discretion led to the enact-
ment of much of modern administrative law, see McNollgast, The Political Origins of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L. ECoN. & ORG. 180, 195-201 (1999); Peter L.
Strauss, Changing Times: The APA at Fifty, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 1389, 1399-1400 (1996).
2 See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411 (1971)
(subjecting an informal, discretionary decision of the Secretary of Transportation to
judicial review on the basis of statutory language prohibiting federal aid for highways
through public parks unless "no feasible and prudent alternative" existed). Overton
Park set the stage for a substantial expansion in the availability (and stringency) of
judicial review governing informal, discretionary decisions. Id. at 410. But review
remains either unavailable or fairly cursory for a massive range of discretionary deci-
sions involving national security, foreign policy, immigration, domestic regulatory en-
forcement, public benefits, and investigation or prosecution. See KENNETH CULP
DAviS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 151-55 (1969). Regarding the trope that judicial re-
view should have an exalted role in constraining arbitrary bureaucratic action, see
Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 317-19 (2002); David Cole,
2oo63
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proves to be nearly unfettered discretion. 3 On a typical day, Labor
Department officials decide what plants to inspect for occupational
safety violations with little or no external review. Prosecutors decide
whom to indict. Treasury officials decide whether to freeze the assets
of a charity because of alleged links to terrorism. Homeland security
inspectors decide whether a Namibian woman will be turned away at a
port of entry without being allowed to plead her case for asylum, and
whose name is placed on a government "no-fly" list. These reservoirs
of discretion persist even in settings where judicial review of executive
branch action is considered a central tool, one that not only resolves
individual claims but prevents systemic mistakes or abuses. 4 Yet the
presumed benefits of discretion have led to a vigorous doctrinal and
policy debate about the proper scope and stringency of such review, 5
Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of Crisis, 101
MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2576-77 (2003); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Ar-
bitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461, 473-74
(2003); James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of
the United States, 118 HAiv. L. Rv. 643, 653 (2004).
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 See, e.g., City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (1997) (sum-
marizing previous interpretation of federal jurisdictional statute by emphasizing the
Court's conclusion that "Congress meant to hold federal agencies accountable by
making their actions subject to judicial review"); Rebecca L. Brown, Accountability,
Liberty, and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 535 (1998) (emphasizing the al-
leged role of judicial review in promoting accountability); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reinvent-
ing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative
Law, 57 U. Prr-r. L. Ruv. 405, 414 (1996) ("The long-term commitment of American
administrative law has been to assure that administrative discretion is structured,
checked, and balanced. Administrative efficacy must be weighed against demands for
liberty and legality, as well as political accountability."). Understandably, judicial re-
view is considered important both because of its role in generating information
about, and promoting the accountability of, executive authorities, and because of its
direct remedial role. Regarding "accountability" see, for example, Michael Asimow,
The Scope offudicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L.
REv. 1157, 1239 (1995);JeffreyJ. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology
and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 587-89 (2002); Mark
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 486, 509-12 (2002); William Christian, Note, Normalization as a
Goal: The Americans With Disabilities Act and Individuals With Mental Retardation, 73 TEx.
L. REV. 409, 417 (1994). The importance of providing a hearing and a remedy for
government actions affecting a protected interest, meanwhile, is firmly lodged at the
core of modern procedural due process doctrine. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976).
5 Voices on one side of the debate emphatically insist on greater opportunities
for highly stringentjudicial review of executive branch actions. See, e.g., DAvis, supra
note 2, at 216 ("The vast quantities of unnecessary discretionary power that have
grown up in our system should be cut back, and the discretionary power that is found
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and in some cases-such as those where a choice is committed by law
to agency discretion under federal administrative law-to almost no
review at all.
This Article challenges the terms of that debate. In the process, it
raises questions about commonly asserted justifications for insulating
executive discretion from external review. The argument demon-
strates how the traditional paradigm of judicial review, despite its en-
during value, sometimes ill serves the goals of helping bureaucratic
organizations learn from their failures and avoid political pressures
endangering their missions. 6 Because complex public bureaucracies
throughout government are increasingly-and perhaps inevitably-
the custodians of discretionary legal authority that can be abused,7 the
problems arise both in national security and domestic regulatory con-
texts-domains that have been traditionally treated separately but in-
creasingly blur.8 The Article then explains how a government agency
to be necessary should be properly confined, structured, and checked."); Cole, supra
note 2, at 2567; Nicole Nice-Petersen, Note, Justice for the "Designated": The Process That
is Due to Alleged U.S. Financiers of Terrorism, 93 GEo. L.J. 1387, 1420 (2005) ("The courts
should not hesitate to act solely because those stripped of their rights are accused
terrorists."). Similarly emphatic voices take the position in equipoise. See, e.g., Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 644
(2003) ("Judicial scrutiny can only interfere with forceful executive action."); Ruth
Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328,
332-35 (2002). Similar debates play out in the context of constitutional torts. See,
e.g., James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. RFv. 393, 395 (2003). At least some of the debate turns on differing views
about the extent to which a larger 'political process" promotes "accountability." I
discuss this infra Part III.
6 Although this Article does not directly address judicial review's role as provider
of individual remedies, the argument developed here is nonetheless relevant to the
provision of remedies by either courts or political actors. See infra Part lI.C (discuss-
ing the relevance of the argument to court review of individual cases); Part I.D (dis-
cussing the implications of the argument for how political actors deliver remedies to
aggrieved individuals or groups).
7 The focus here is primarily on the type of routine executive discretion, such as
that vested in a prosecutorial authority, to impose costs on discrete individuals or
groups with minimal judicial intervention. Cf Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,
837-38 (1985) (holding that in the absence of a specific statutory requirement to the
contrary, regulatory agency's decision not to exercise authority in a particular context
where such authority could be exercised is committed to agency discretion). For a
discussion of routine executive discretion, see infra notes 29-34 and accompanying
text.
8 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 IARv. L. REv. 2663,
2672 (2005) ("In war no less than in peace, the inquiry into presidential authority can
be organized and disciplined if it is undertaken with close reference to standard prin-
ciples of administrative law.").
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can perform quasi-judicial audits of discretionary decisions, akin to
the sample audits occasionally employed by courts in class actions and
government fraud cases. 9 If an auditing agency overcomes the rele-
vant political barriers and conceptual challenges,' 0 it can fill crucial
gaps left by existing mechanisms to generate information about exec-
utive branch performance.
Part I begins by describing how judicial review plays a prominent
role in generating information about executive branch decisions. The
picture of executive discretion that emerges in such a system will inevi-
tably depend on the structural features of judicial review. That pic-
ture will reflect, for instance, the courts' tendency to balance the
potential benefits and costs of discretion by routinely applying differ-
ing degrees of stringency when reviewing executive decisions. Sup-
pose that the issue is the fate of individuals designated as enemy
combatants. Whether on their own or in accord with legislative com-
mands, courts can increase the stringency of review by requiring more
thorough hearings before someone is designated, and by decreasing
the deference accorded to the outcome of those hearings or (in the
absence of hearings) to the executive determinations themselves."1
Greater stringency of review presumably reduces the probability that
someone would be improperly labeled an enemy combatant. At the
9 See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
10 For a discussion of the proverbial "guarding the guardians" problem, see infra
notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
11 Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988) (finding CIA director's
power to fire employees on national security grounds committed by law to agency
discretion), with Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 387 F.3d
989, 997 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding, under an arbitrary and capricious standard that the
court understood to require "hard look" review, that the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment's environmental assessments of two timber sales, conducted pursuant to the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, were inadequate because they failed to consider the
cumulative impact of the sales). I do not mean to minimize the subtleties of the
variegated constitutional, statutory, and prudential doctrines on which courts (and
even legislatures) draw when they decide on how much discretion to grant. Separa-
tion of powers, deference to national security and foreign policy decisions, judicial
deference to expert determinations of government agencies, and statutory interpreta-
tion techniques all figure in this process. Even the two cases cited represent extraor-
dinarily different contexts, and the kinds of discretion involved in the decisions are
also different. The point is that nearly any plausible applications of such doctrines
require (or, at the very least, allow) some consequentialist balancing of the costs and
benefits associated with discretion, and different ways of striking that balance are asso-
ciated with distinct degrees of stringency in the courts' review of some executive deci-
sion. As these two cases show, courts indeed strike different balances when applying
these doctrines, and in the process, they set different degrees of stringency for the
review of discretionary executive decisions.
[VOL. 82:1
AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
same time, greater stringency allegedly increases the resources that
society must expend on the review process and that the executive
branch must expend defending its decisions. 12 If stricter review con-
sumes substantially greater resources or creates a material possibility
of embarrassment for executive officials, it may also chill the authori-
ties from designating individuals that should (in an ideal world) re-
ceive such a designation. In response, courts and legislatures tend to
vary the stringency of review governing a given pool of potential cases.
But the assumption that courts should apply the same degree of
review stringency to every present and future case in a particular class
entails its own costs. By forging rules applying to every case in a par-
ticular class, courts and legislators can impose dramatic limits on soci-
ety's ability to learn how executive discretion is used.13 Increasing the
stringency of review for a single decision appears difficult, if not im-
possible, without sharply increasing costly burdens on courts and the
government. Even if one assumes that existing rules governing strin-
gency of review reflect a careful analysis of marginal costs and bene-
fits, existing limits on review stringency almost certainly augur
problems for society's ability to learn how discretion is used.
Government regulators and private employers routinely avoid
such traps. Instead of reviewing an entire population's behavior, they
obtain samples of it. Insurance companies examine a subset of closed
files to assess the quality of payout determinations. 14 Government
agents select a subset of plants to inspect or accounting records to
scrutinize.'1 This tactic can be easily adapted by a court-supervised or
independent authority to generate information about public bureau-
cracies. The defining feature of this technique is its rejection of an
implicit assumption that a given degree of review stringency should be
applied to all cases in a class. Despite their relative absence from dis-
cussions of how to constrain government discretion, audits of this
12 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 11-12, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020 (arguing that further factual development of
the circumstances surrounding an alleged enemy combatant's designation as such
"would divert the military's attention from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan"); Re-
ply Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (No. 83-
1878), 1984 WL 566059 ("[R] espondents' submission, if accepted, would allow anyone
to seek judicial review of the agency's decision not to bring enforcement proceedings
under any portion of the Act." (emphasis added)).
13 Moralistic intuitions about the importance of horizontal equity combine with
the content of legal doctrines such as stare decisis to complicate the possibility of
using differing degrees of stringency to review cases in the same class. See infra Part
I.B.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 109-10.
15 See infra Part I.D.1.
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kind are familiar from private and public sector contexts. By provid-
ing an alternative to imposing a single stringency standard across the
board, audits can disrupt the familiar, repetitive debate about whether
society deserves greater judicial protection of its rights and preroga-
tives. Put differently, even if one accepts the executive branch's stri-
dent (and often questionable) assertions that the sky would fall if
discretion were more easily reviewed in court, there remains a viable
option for assessing that discretion without incurring the various costs
associated with traditional judicial review.
Nor would audits merely duplicate what judicial review could al-
ready achieve, either at existing or higher levels of stringency. Under
quite reasonable assumptions, it is preferable from a social welfare
perspective to use new resources at the margin for auditing instead of
using them to expand deferential judicial review. Audits may even be
valuable in a world where politicians are divided about what consti-
tutes effective performance-though implementing audits under such
conditions will tend to prove difficult.
Admittedly, the case for audits is a qualified one. Political con-
straints may occasionally check discretionary abuses. As will become
clear, not all types of executive discretion should be placed in the
same analytical category. The case for auditing may be stronger in the
case of discrete applications of legal authority to individuals or groups
than in the case of broad policy decisions that courts have historically
excluded from review under the political question doctrine. 16 None-
theless, the absence of audits for routine discretionary decisions al-
most certainly diminishes the capacity of legislators and the public to
detect executive branch manipulation, 17 dampens the incentives of
executive branch bureaucracies to learn from their mistakes, and
makes it easy for key actors in the system to avoid articulating (either
16 See infra Part I.A.
17 Of course, the mere creation of some auditing system does not automatically
solve organizational learning and accountability problems. As Part 11 explains, a great
deal depends on details of institutional design. The impact of an audit system also
depends on the public's response, and the institutional dynamics affecting that re-
sponse. Audit systems can be counterproductive if they merely provide a false sense
of security-which is in some sense precisely my criticism ofjudicial review in many of
the contexts I discuss in this Article. Nonetheless, the status quo seems even more
likely to provide precisely that false sense of security because it lacks many of the
potential advantages that a carefully-structured audit system could generate. For a
thoughtful discussion of the role of audits and the pitfalls in designing them, see
generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDiT SocIErY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION 123 (1999)
("The audit society is a society that endangers itself because it invests too heavily in
shallow rituals of verification at the expense of other forms of organizational
intelligence.").
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in statutory or executive mandates) what standards are actually sup-
posed to govern executive discretion. The information on bureau-
cratic performance generated by audits could even dynamically
influence courts deciding how stringently to review government ac-
tion, or whether such action comports with procedural due process
norms.' Ultimately, audits may also exert an impact on the political
context shaping the allocation of power to government. In principle,
that context should reflect an accountability/power trade-off, where
political audiences may prove willing to see the executive branch get
more power but only if it could be reliably supervised. While the devil
may be in the details, Part II surveys some of these problems and dis-
cusses how they might be plausibly resolved.
Part III broadens the focus beyond judicial review. Obviously,
formal judicial review is not the only means through which executive
power may be constrained. Other factors include some combination
of the press, audit bureaucracies such as the Government Accountabil-
ity Office (GAO) and Inspectors General (IG), legislators, and even
organized interests and social movements drawing support from
among the mass public. As the analysis below explains, formal review
mechanisms-such as audits or judicial review-are often critical in
galvanizing subsequent interest from legislators, the media, organized
interests, and the public.
Moreover, it turns out that amidst the swirl of budget votes in
Congress, committee hearings, GAO investigations of FBI computers,
and IG reports on immigration policy, neither legislatures nor the au-
dit bureaucracies focus on systematically auditing executive discre-
tion. 19 As Part IV indicates, the relative absence of sampling
techniques in the review of executive branch legal decisions may arise
from a conceptual blurring of the direct-remedy and information-pro-
ducing functions of review, and probably leads courts to under-use the
sampling methodologies that some judges have cautiously deployed in
class actions and government fraud cases. In addition, legislators and
organized interests, like the executive branch itself, may lack incen-
tives to deploy audits or analogous sampling methodologies. This pat-
tern of neglect predictably affects how legislatures bargain over
executive power and review the consequences of those bargains. It
also affects how legislative goals percolate through the audit bureau-
18 See infra Part I.D.1 (discussing the potential for dynamic interaction between
audits and judicial review).
19 As Part I explains, this means that the audit bureaucracies generally appear not
to: (1) take random samples of decisions in a legal domain involving decisions directly
affecting individuals or groups, (2) assess decisions in accordance with a defensible
pre-defined standard, and (3) release the results publicly.
2006]
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cracies, drawing their attention to procurement 
fraud and similarly
tangible examples of waste. Furthermore, to the extent 
that the audit
bureaucracies retain some autonomy to allocate 
their resources, they
appear to remain in the thrall of their initial 
role as financial auditors
and the more recently acquired role of auditor 
of government per-
formance that nonetheless generally fails to 
encompass sampling.
While this picture is not immediately encouraging, 
it does suggest that
as audit bureaucracies expand their autonomy, 
they may be able to
entice a constituency to value audits of executive 
discretion if agency
leaders choose to pursue such a goal.
Even in the face of such efforts to enhance 
the organizational
autonomy of the audit bureaucracies, the preceding 
factors may none-
theless continue locking in suboptimal institutional 
responses to seri-
ous legal problems. The status quo also makes 
it easier for advocates
of executive power to confound different kinds 
of arguments for limit-
ing external review-those based on concerns 
about the practical bur-
dens associated with judicial review, and those based on structural,
separation of powers concerns associated with 
doctrines such those
governing the review of so-called political questions. 
In response, this
case study and thought experiment aims to clarify 
matters by focusing
on three recurring challenges that arise in connection 
with existing
(sub-optimal) institutional responses: (1) the importance 
of recogniz-
ing the inherent limitations of traditional judicial review as a 
means of
managing government discretion, (2) the value of envisioning 
new in-
stitutional designs to manage discretion more 
effectively, and (3) the
need for reasonable strategies to implement those 
designs in a politi-
cally complicated world. To address those 
challenges, this Article
seeks to broaden the scope of potential solutions, 
and to shed light on
the forces that shape public perceptions of whether 
those solutions
even exist.
1. THE CASE FOR AUDITING EXECUTiVE DISCRETION
A. Definitions
Discretion can be defined as the extent of legal 
flexibility to use
government power vested in executive branch 
officials-including,
but not limited to, power over personnel, budgets, 
information, and
legallysanctioned coercive authority to 
affect the world. 20 Govern-
20 Among the nuances distinguishing different 
types of discretion, one might rec-
ognize a distinction between the actual, de jure amount of flexibility 
the law permits
(as in the examples of routine executive discretion), and 
the de facto amount of
discretion that results from the fact that review of 
a given decision is limited or almost
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ment officials exercise a certain measure of 
discretion virtually every
time they do something. Though government 
actions are rarely
purely discretionary, neither is discretion ever 
entirely absent. Conse-
quently, distinctions in the amount of executive 
discretion are rela-
tive. The distinctions that lawyers and policymakers 
fight over tend to
be about whether to give the executive branch 
relatively more, or rela-
tively less discretion compared to a certain 
baseline. Outside the con-
text of the political question doctrine, lawyers, 
judges, and scholars
focusing on federal regulatory activity have 
understood that baseline
to include court review of executive 
action.2 1
At the same time, courts and commentators 
have long acknowl-
edged the importance of some deviations 
from that baseline. Thus,
while the classic case of Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volp
2
firmly establishes close judicial scrutiny of a discretionary 
decision as a
presumptive means of policing executive 
decisions, 23 other cases in
the administrative law canon make an equally 
compelling case for a
greater measure of discretion. In some 
cases the Court famously rec-
ognized the existence of domains of government 
authority best left,
for reasons of constitutional structure, 
entirely to the elected
branches.2 4 In contrast to this "political question 
discretion," a some-
entirely absent (as may occur in the context of police 
searches involving situations
that do not give rise to criminal proceedings and therefore 
are not policed through
the exclusionary rule). Although the primary focus 
of the argument is on the former
type of discretion, the present analysis also 
has implications for the latter-because
expanding the range of available review mechanisms 
may change policyrnakers' and
legal interpreters' willingness to impose review 
that could change the extent of de
facto discretion.
21 See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 141 (1967) (relying on pre-
sumption of reviewability in federal administrative 
law). For examples from the states,
see State Dep't of Fish & Game v. Meyer, 906 P.2d 
1365, 1370 (Alaska 1995) (acknowl-
edging that final agency action is presumed reviewable); 
Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 237 N.W.2d 375, 379 
(Minn. 1975) (recogniz-
ing presumption of reviewability for state administrative 
decisions); Pisano v. Shil-
linger, 835 P.2d 1136, 1138-39 (Wyo. 1992) (presuming 
reviewability of state
administrative action). For a discussion of how the institutional 
design of judicial
review in the European Union provides for the review 
of administrative action, see
generally Jurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review in EC Law-Some 
Reflections on the Origins
and the Actual Legal Situation, 51 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 17, 22-27 (2002).
22 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
23 Id. at 410.
24 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
As I acknowl-
edge below, there may indeed be some contexts where 
discretion does (and ought to)
mean no review-from courts, auditors, or anyone else. 
My suggestion is simply that
we ought to proceed with great caution in considering 
the rationales for that kind of
discretion. In particular, we ought to recognize 
that the rationales for limiting or
even barring judicial review in some contexts do not necessarily speak 
to the question
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what different form of discretion exists that 
could be described as
"routine executive discretion." It is this form of discretion that was
the subject of another canonical case, Heckler v. Chaney,
25 where the
Court considered the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny 
of a regu-
latory agency's discretionary enforcement 
decisions 26 and emphasized
the value of limiting judicial intervention in such matters 
by analogiz-
ing regulatory enforcement discretion 
to prosecutorial discretion in
the criminal context.
27 It is this form of targeted discretion to directly
affect individuals and groups that most resembles 
the "executive dis-
cretion" with which this Article is concerned. 
As many commentators
have acknowledged,
28 preserving the type of bureaucratic discretion
at issue in Chaney and similar cases from 
judicial intervention raises
the risk that executive authorities 
will behave in an arbitrary fashion.
2 9
It will come as no surprise that the arguments 
for discretion in
Chaney and similar cases are routinely bolstered 
by assertions about
the value of bureaucratic expertise. In Panama Canal 
Co. v. Grace Line,
Inc.,30 for example, the Court considered 
the claims of American ship-
ping companies demanding that new tolls 
be set on the Panama Ca-
nal.31 The key passage of the Court's reasoning 
applied the following
now-familiar logic:
of whether we should also bar an alternative 
form of re.view. Put differently, perhaps
one might envision an array of review mechanisms 
to address the fact that the two
kinds of discretion are on a continuum, and at 
intermediate places on the continuum
we might do well to use audits (or some other system of 
review) instead of leaving the
executive unrestrained.
25 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
26 Id. at 831.
27 Id. at 834-35. The analogy bolstered the 
Court's case for limiting judicial in-
terference in the Chaney context (involving the Food and 
Drug Administration) be-
cause the perception was already so deeply 
rooted among courts that judicial
regulation of prosecutorial discretion would unduly 
burden the administration ofjus-
tice. Cf Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) 
("In our system, so long as
the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that 
the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not 
to prosecute, and what charge to file
or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 
discretion.").
28 See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 2, at 473-74 
(noting that judicial review is effec-
tive as the main protection against abuse of 
executive discretion).
29 See infra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of those risks. Although 
cases like Chaney
may seem less troubling to some because they 
involve a government decision to re-
strain from acting, such a decision still counts 
as action under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (2000), and is potentially 
no less coercive to
individuals whose desired outcomes depend 
on government action. Part 1I, infra, dis-
cusses how the practical problems of reviewing 
executive decisions not to act may be
solved through alternatives to traditional judicial review.
30 356 U.S. 309 (1958).
31 Id. at 310.
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[T] he present conflict rages over questions that at heart involve
problems of statutory construction and cost accounting: whether an
operating deficit in the auxiliary or supporting activities is a legiti-
mate cost in maintaining and operating the Canal for purpose of
the toll formula. These are matters on which experts may disagree;
they involve nice issues of judgment and choice, which require the
exercise of informed discretion.3 2
Even when lawyers advocating on behalf of executive power echo
the Court in extolling the value of such Chaney-type executive discre-
tion, they nonetheless tend to implicitly accept a baseline state of the
world where courts play a significant role in reviewing government
action. 33 Such recognition of the value of judicial supervision is a fa-
miliar one in the United States and in most other developed nations
(and many developing ones).3 4 In criminal prosecutions, voting
rights cases, and labor law injunctions, for example, the completion of
some action of the executive branch (such as subjecting someone to
the detriments associated with being convicted of a crime) is condi-
tioned on judicial approval. Observers and policymakers may diverge
on how easy it should be for a court to impose a labor injunction or to
convict a defendant. But if they fail in persuading the legislature to
water down the substantive standard that applies, advocates of discre-
32 Id. at 317 (citing New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 335 (1947)).
33 See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 12, at 25. The government's
language in the brief is typical of the positions that lawyers for the executive branch
have taken in this Administration-and not dramatically different (on the core issue
of deference)-from that taken by lawyers for other presidential administrations. It
states:
As this Court has observed, "courts traditionally have been reluctant to
intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security
affairs." The customary deference that courts afford the Executive in mat-
ters of military affairs is especially warranted in this context.
A commander's wartime determination that an individual is an enemy
combatant is a quintessentially military judgment, representing a core exer-
cise of the Commander-in-Chief authority....
Especially in the course of hostilities, the military through its operations
and intelligence-gathering has an unmatched vantage point from which to
learn about the enemy and make judgments as to whether those seized dur-
ing a conflict are friend or foe.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)).
34 This statement should not obscure the massive extent of variation among legal
systems, many of which assign quite different roles to judicial institutions. The point
is that it is quite common for those different systems to assign considerable impor-
tance to the goal of reviewing executive action through courts. See generally Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 99, 101
(1994) (recognizing differences in the "form, function, and degree of reciprocal en-
gagement" among legal systems).
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tion are left to mount a vigorous case before a court that is quite per-
sistently unwilling to simply defer to executive discretion. Even when
such review does not occur in advance of government action, the ex-
ecutive branch presumably labors in the shadow of the embarrassing
possibility that a license grant, a regulatory rule, a criminal conviction,
or a fine will be subsequently invalidated. 35 These realities imply that
we can measure the benefits of executive discretion against a baseline
of relatively intrusive judicial review. 36 We can also assess the poten-
tial benefits of alternative means of reviewing routine discretionary
actions-such as random audits of those decisions-by comparing
those alternatives to the existing framework of traditional judicial
review.
B. Examples of Routine Executive Discretion
As a prelude to understanding the case for an alternative means
of review, consider two categories of routine executive discretion in-
volving bureaucratic flexibility to use legal authority affecting individ-
uals and groups. Though observers may argue about the prescriptive
merits of lodging so much discretion in the bureaucracy, neither cate-
gory reflects a judicial decision to exercise restraint on account of the
political question doctrine or structural separation of powers ratio-
35 Actually measuring the precise impact of review with some analytical clarity is
enormously complex, but a number of scholars have made convincing arguments to
this effect using qualitative or quantitative methodologies in different contexts. For
some cogent examples, see JEVRY L. MASHAW & DAVID HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFE-W 147-71 (1990) (suggesting that the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration's reliance on costly recalls of questionable safety effects rather than pro-
spective rulemaking has in part been driven by the impact of intrusive judicial review
in rulemaking); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the
Lower Courts, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 205, 212-13 (2003) (analyzing whether changes in the
ideological composition of lower courts affected decisions of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to grant permits for development of wetlands, and finding that a standard
deviation increase in estimated pro-environmental ideology of the lower courts de-
creased the probability that the Corps would grant a permit by fourteen percent);
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Profes-
sor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528 (1997) (discussing the impact of the "ossifica-
tion" of rulemaking, where judicial review, among other factors, shapes agencies'
willingness to use regulatory authority).
36 Moreover, there is no good reason to expect that courts or legislators routinely
strike the proper balance (under almost any defensible definition of "proper") when
they police discretion outside the context of separation of powers and the political
question doctrine. My claim is this: at a minimum, Chaney-type discretion directly
affecting individuals and justified on consequentialist grounds concentrates great
power in executive authorities and raises questions about the appropriate extent of
bureaucratic flexibility that should be permitted.
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nales. 7 Instead, what these examples tend to reflect is a pragmatic
calculus in judicial opinions, or encompassed by legislative enact-
ments subject to judicial interpretation.
1. Example # 1: Generally Unreviewable Executive Decisions
A small but important class of executive decisions are subject only
to the barest degree of judicial review. In federal administrative law,
certain activities are described (in a somewhat tautological fashion) as
being committed by law to agency discretion. Chaney itself is a classic
example. Death row inmates were thwarted in their quest to force the
FDA into blocking state prison authorities from using drugs for an
unapproved purpose consisting of execution.3 8 But analysts have long
understood how the case's larger implications lie beyond its unusual
facts. 39 The case cements a barrier to review of bureaucratic decisions
involving the nonenforcement (or enforcement) of regulatory man-
dates. As the situation for the death row inmates readily illustrates,
decisions involving how to enforce legal mandates (e.g., involving
prohibitions on the unapproved use of pharmaceutical products) can
have effects on some individuals and groups as coercive as decisions
regarding the substance of a regulatory or statutory mandate itself
(e.g., for what uses a product is approved).
Yet the case also hints at the practical problems that would ensue
from a full judicialization of agency enforcement discretion. It bor-
ders on madness for courts (or legislatures) to allow protracted litiga-
tion whenever a party is aggrieved by its decision to enforce legal
mandates in a manner other than how the litigant believes the agency
should.40 As the Chaney Court readily appreciated, a similar problem
37 The invocation of such doctrines could also be scrutinized and subjected to
criticism, but such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the present Article.
38 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 823-28 (1985).
39 See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 692 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. Rrv. 653, 654 (1985). For an insightful pre- Chaney
perspective on reviewability, see generally Harvey Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Func-
tional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968).
40 See Chancy, 470 U.S. at 831-32 ("[Aln agency decision not to enforce often
involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its
expertise.... An agency generally cannot act against each technical violation of the
statute it is charged with enforcing. The agency is far better equipped than the courts
to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.").
From the Court's perspective, matters would have been different if legislators explic-
itly crafted statutes to require such review. See id. at 832-33 ("[T]he decision is only
presumptively unreviewable; the presumption may be rebutted where the substantive
statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement
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arises in the context of prosecutorial discretion of federal, state, and
local criminal justice authorities.4I And a similar conclusion is
reached by courts in that context: the system would break down if
stringent court review of prosecutorial charging decisions (or declina-
tions) became anything other than exceedingly rare-available only
in exceptional circumstances, if at all.42 Indeed, courts have recur-
sively found that prosecutors harbor an inherent power to choose
whom to charge with few (if any) judicially imposed constraints. 43
Courts are rarely entirely absent from reviewing discretionary ac-
tions. Judges and the legislators who shape the relevant statutory
mandates may pull back from the brink of concluding that they will
reject any possible claim associated with an ostensibly unreviewable
decision. The law says, for example, that the CIA Director has author-
ity to fire employees for being national security risks. 44 It also says he
has the power to define what "national security risk" means, which lets
him arbitrarily fire someone for being gay (he has).45 The decision of
the CIA Director is, however, subject to limited constitutional re-
view. 46 Even when all or most alternative review is precluded, courts
can restrain egregious government conduct of some kinds, such as
powers."). Absent some exceptional circumstances, they would be loath to do so. Cf
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986) (bolstering a
conclusion that Congress had deliberately precluded judicial review of the amount of
Medicare Part B claims in order to "'avoid overloading the courts' with 'trivial mat-
ters,' a consequence which would 'unduly ta[x]' the federal court system with 'little
real value' to be received by participants in the program" (quoting United States v.
Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 210 n.13 (1982))).
41 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831 ("This Court has recognized on several occasions
over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce ... is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion."); id. at 834 (concluding that
the court of appeals erred in finding inapplicable the "principle of absolute
prosecutorial discretion").
42 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967). For an
insightful doctrinal review, see Lara Beth Sheer, Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 GEO. L.J.
1353 (1998).
43 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464. As Davis cogently observed, "[a] judicial trial is an
acceptance of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute, not a review of it. Even a quick
finding of not guilty may leave untouched the harms that flow from the prosecution."
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 209 n.21.
44 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 403-404a(e) (West Supp. 2006).
45 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602-04 (1988).
46 A variety of practical problems for the claimant, beginning with discovery and
exacerbated by courts' tendency to defer to executive branch national security deci-
sions, make it doubtful this avenue for review would exert much of an effect on the
behavior of the agency's leadership.
( OL. 82:1
AUDITING EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
those that might give rise to viable constitutional tort claims. 47 But
the sliver of review available in the context of federal constitutional
claims (or similar claims based on state law) does not change an en-
during reality: bureaucratic decisionmakers retain nearly unfettered
freedom from review in a bewildering range of contexts directly affect-
ing individuals and groups, involving regulatory enforcement,
prosecutorial discretion, and national security authority. Defenders of
existing limits may offer defensible rationales for not subjecting these
domains to routine judicial review or its equivalent.48 But the limits
on review also engender a series of risks, discussed in more detail
below.
2. Example # 2: Highly Deferential Review
Despite the fact that some decisions are formally committed to
agency discretion, most of the time legislators consider regulatory ac-
tions too important to commit entirely to agency discretion. Instead
they create procedural mandates-such as the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) 49-to restrain the scope of executive discretion. In
still other cases, courts interpret constitutional provisions and statu-
tory mandates to impose procedural obligations on executive bureau-
cracies.50  While procedural requirements help determine the
distribution of scarce political and legal resources among political and
legal decisionmakers, at times the constraints they impose turn out to
be milder than they first appear. The constraints then become part of
a system of de facto discretion. Despite the formal availability of re-
view, the meager extent to which decisions are actually scrutinized ex-
acerbates certain risks-of mistakes, politically motivated self-dealing,
and outright malfeasance-while often making it more difficult for
external legislative or media-driven checks on executive discretion to
operate. 51 The following two examples-featuring the contexts of na-
tional security as well as domestic regulation-illustrate the dynamic.
47 See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1998, at 21, 25; sources cited supra note 2.
48 See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ram-
sey, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 295-355 (2001);John
Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 810 (2004).
49 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
50 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004) (plurality opinion).
51 Why this state of affairs may be problematic for dominant legislative coalitions
without prompting them to fix it is discussed in Part V.
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a. Asset Freezing
The President and federal officials assisting him 
have powerful
tools to regulate foreign economic activities. One 
such tool, involving
designations under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) ,52 lets the President "block," or freeze 
access to, any
property subject to United States jurisdiction, when two conditions 
ap-
ply. First, the property in question must be something 
in which a for-
eign country or national has an interest.
53 This constraint turns out
not to be much of a limitation on the President's 
power, since courts
have found that the "foreign" interest does not 
have to be a legal in-
terest of any kind. The mere fact that an American 
organization has
foreign beneficiaries may be enough, in fact, for 
a court to say that it
has a "foreign interest."
54 Second, the President must use this power
only during an emergency.
55 This is not much of a limitation either.
The "unusual and extraordinary threat" giving 
rise to the emergency
must have its source partly outside the United 
States. 56 It must pose a
threat to the "national security, foreign policy, 
or economy of the
United States."57 Given the combined effect 
of this expansive lan-
guage and traditional judicial deference on matters of national 
secur-
ity and foreign affairs, Presidents have found 
it relatively easy to
declare emergencies under the law (about ten of which 
are currently
in effect).s8 Courts have yet to find, under the terms of 
IEEPA, that a
supposed emergency does not exist.
In a series of executive orders, the President 
has delegated much
of his authority under IEEPA to the Secretaries 
of State and Treasury.
Under the resulting system, the Treasury's 
Office of Foreign Asset
Control (OFAC) blocks the assets of groups branded "Specially 
Desig-
52 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000). See generallyJamesJ. Savage, 
Executive Use of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act--Evolution 
Through the Terrorist and Taliban
Sanctions, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE LJ., Winter 
2001, at 28, 28-31 (describing the his-
tory and effect of IEEPA).
53 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
54 See Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 
315 F.3d 748, 752-53 (7th Cir. 2002).
55 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See generally Jason Luong, Note, Forcing 
Constraint: The Case for Amending the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 78 
TEx. L. REV. 1181, 1197 (2000) ("Con-
gress has consistently acquiesced to the economic 
regulations enacted by the presi-
dent under the IEEPA because of inadequate 
legislative drafting, lack of political will,
and popular support for the most common 
of the IEEPA regulations-economic
sanctions and embargoes.").
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nated Terrorist Organizations.
5 9 Once a group becomes a specially
designated terrorist organization, it loses control 
over its fate. The
impact of the OFAC's orders is to block the organization's 
funds, re-
gardless of where in the financial system they happen 
to be. Each
violation of the blocking orders can trigger a separate 
civil fine of up
to $50,000,60 and willful violators are subject to criminal penalties, 
in-
cluding up to twenty years imprisonment and fines 
of up to $50,000
per violation.6 1 A similar designation also triggers 
severe criminal
penalties punishing individuals for providing "material 
support" (in-
cluding funds and in-kind economic contributions 
such as lodging) to
designated terrorist organizations.
62
Take a closer look at how a court reviews the government's 
desig-
nations. In the recent case, Holy Land Foundation 
for Relief and Develop-
ment v. Ashcrofl,63 the State and Treasury departments used 
their
delegated presidential IEEPA powers to freeze 
the assets of the Holy
Land Foundation (HLF).64 Court review of the blocking 
order con-
sidered whether it was "arbitrary and capricious" 
under the terms of
the Administrative Procedure Act.
65 But given the national security
context of the decision, the reviewing district and 
appellate courts also
interpreted the relevant law to require a highly 
deferential form of
review.66 The district court, for example, emphasized 
the limited
scope of its role.6 7 The key factual question, the 
district court and the
litigants agreed, was the extent of HLF's connection 
to Hamas, an-
other specially designated terrorist organization 
(and one that, at least
at this point, few people had reason to doubt 
as a "terrorist organiza-
tion").68 The district court conducted a careful examination 
of the
record and uncovered "ample" evidence that
(1) HLF has had financial connections to Hamas since its creation
in 1989; (2) HLF leaders have been actively involved in various
meetings with Hamas leaders; (3) HILF funds Hamas-controlled
charitable organizations; (4) HLF provides financial support 
to the
orphans and families of Hamas martyrs and 
prisoners; (5) HLF's
59 Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 
333 F.3d 156, 160 (D.C. Cir.
2003).
60 50 U.S.C.A. § 1705(a) (West Supp. July 2006).
61 Id. § 1705.
62 18 U.S.C. § 2339 (2000 & Supp. 11I 2003).
63 333 F.3d 156.
64 Id. at 159-60.
65 Id. at 162.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 161.
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Jerusalem office acted on behalf of Hamas; and (6) FBI informants
reliably reported that HLF funds Hamas.69
The D.C. Circuit upheld this determination on appeal. 70 In do-
ing so, the court legitimized a review process that arguably renders
administrable the federal government's web of emergency economic
regulatory powers. That process might also strike some observers as
particularly thorough. But whatever one's views about the former is-
sue, the latter perception is mistaken, for at least two reasons. First,
the court considers only whether the decision was "arbitrary and capri-
cious," and based on "substantial evidence," not whether it was right
or wrong.71 That determination, moreover, reflects a statutory text
(the APA and IEEPA) and tradition that makes the court's inquiry
extremely deferential and perhaps helps explain why so few of these
determinations get challenged in court (because it's not clear what
will be gained). Second, as a practical matter, the court's inquiry
(even where, as in Holy Land, the district court pushes the envelope in
terms of the stringency of its review) begins and ends with the record
that the government itself compiles. As the district court itself noted
in this case, the arbitrary and capricious standard "does not allow the
courts to undertake their own fact finding, but [instead only allows
the court] to review the agency's record to determine whether the
agency's decision was supported by a rational basis."72 That record
may be a tremendously accurate compilation of the government's evi-
dence. Or it may be patently misleading. Nothing requires the gov-
ernment to report evidence tending to cast doubt on its
contentions. 73 Nor does the court interview the sources on which the
record is based; thus court review is only as good as the record.
The flip side of this point is that court review will probably exert
only a limited impact on the quality of that record. A court will vacate
the designation if the record in question turns out to be an empty
folder. On the other hand, officials who want to evade that possibility
need only make sure there is a thick enough record to make it hard
for the court to conclude that such a record makes the designation
69 Id. (quoting Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d
57, 69 (D.D.C. 2002)).
70 Id. at 161-63.
71 Id. at 163 (applying these standards in reviewing the actions and record at
hand).
72 Id. at 162.
73 Ironically enough, the Holy Land appeals panel suggested that the govern-
ment's position was strengthened by the fact that "Ithere was no plausible evidence
presented which showed that [ties to Hamas] had been severed." Id.
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look totally arbitrary. Yet the record itself is based on decisions that
are essentially immune from review.74
b. Environmental and Occupational Safety Administrative
Compliance Orders
By subjecting individuals to severe practical and reputational con-
sequences, harsh criminal indictments may operate as discretionary
sanctions. But individuals and organizations tend to face formal pun-
ishments in the criminal justice system only after they are convicted or
admit their guilt. Statutes creating major regulatory programs reflect
a different premise. Many such laws allow regulators to levy fines or
issue orders restricting certain activities with more limited court inter-
vention. Although they vary in the relevant legal standard or the size
of the maximum fine, those orders can have an effect before judicial
intervention. Even after that intervention, it is not clear how well the
stringency of review provided by courts (which tends to conform to
some variation of the "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discre-
tion" standards) strikes the most desirable balance between re-
straining abuse and providing regulatory flexibility.
For instance, when the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA) or its contractors have some reason to think busi-
nesses are violating their general duty to provide a safe working
environment, the agency can issue abatement orders and citations. 75
Although parties may (and often do) contest citations, doing so is ex-
pensive, which means some parties just pay the relatively meager fines
OSHA tends to assess instead of contesting them. Penalties for violat-
ing compliance orders are considerably more severe under environ-
mental statutes, like the Clean Air Act.76 Under that statute, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) can issue an Administrative
Compliance Order (ACO) on the basis of "any available information,"
directing a regulated party-such as an electricity generation plant-
74 Manipulation of the record, moreover, need not be conscious or explicit. A
number of pressures could affect the considerable number of investigators, analysts,
spies, lawyers, and higher level officials whose work influences the record that the
court reviews. As long as they feel at least some subtle pressure to support the conclu-
sion that a designation should be made, they may fail to consider countervailing argu-
ments, or the potential consequences of an "erroneous" designation (i.e., erroneous
in the sense of not complying with the statute, the President's executive order, the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard, or the executive branch's stated goals for using
the IEEPA emergency powers).
75 See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a)-(c) (2000).
76 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 4 01- 7 6 71q (2000 & Supp. ItI 2003).
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or state agency to comply with the 
Clean Air Act's requirements.
7
While the ACO does not allow the EPA to impose 
fines or other penal-
ties directly, the order triggers provisions imposing 
civil or criminal
penalties for violation of the order.
78 Under the terms of the Act, it
initially appeared as though judicial review of an ACO was 
supposed
to focus on whether the regulated party violated 
the terms of the or-
der, not whether the EPA was right to issue it 
in the first place. 79 This
has understandably raised questions about how 
the order itself should
be reviewed. In recent cases, the Supreme 
Court and several circuit
courts have left some uncertainty about whether 
the ACO structure
withstands constitutional scrutiny given its due 
process implications.
At least one circuit has found ACOs not to be final 
agency actions,
thereby rendering them unreviewable and raising 
the due process
problem.80 The Supreme Court declined to review 
this case, and in-
stead-in a separate case-upheld a Ninth 
Circuit opinion holding
ACOs to be final agency actions and reviewing 
them under the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard.
81
Both agencies therefore retain enormous power 
over when to im-
pose compliance orders. OSHA obviously has 
it when it issues cita-
tions and abatement orders, some of which 
are not challenged
subsequently. Even if "arbitrary and capricious" 
review is not as defer-
ential in this context as it is with asset freezes, 
it still leaves the court
applying a fairly deferential standard of review 
to a decision that can
be based on "any available information.
82 It is quite plausible that
the extent of resulting stringency in review 
is a reasonable compro-
mise if the standard is going to be applied across 
the board, to every
compliance order. It is also quite possible that 
such review will not say
much about the quality of compliance order 
decisions, which could
(or perhaps should) ultimately affect the extent of confidence 
in the
regulatory structures. Put differently, more exhaustive 
review of regu-
latory decisions to impose compliance orders 
could change the bun-
77 Id. § 7413(a) (5).
78 See id. § 7413(b)-(c). For a detailed discussion, see generally 
Jason D. Nichols,
Towards Reviving the Efficacy of Administrative Compliance Orders: 
Balancing Due Process
Concerns and the Need for Enforcement Flexibility in Environmental 
Law, 57 ADm IN. L. REv.
193, 197-99 (2005) (discussing the EPA's use of ACOs to 
enforce the Clean Air Act).
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(2).
80 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 
1236, 1258 (1 th Cir. 2003).
81 See Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation 
v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496 (2004);
Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 298 
F.3d 814, 822 (9th Cir. 2002), affd
540 U.S. 461.
82 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (5).
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die of substantive powers and penalties that could be acceptable to an
enacting legislative and interest group coalition.
C. How Discretion is Managed Through Variations in the Stringency of
Traditional Judicial Review
The preceding examples demonstrate how even the availability of
substantive review can conceal vast reservoirs of bureaucratic flexibil-
ity. A host of other domains-varying in the availability of formal re-
view but not in the fact that they leave authorities with discretion-
pose similar problems. Such domains involve, among others, the im-
pact of prosecutors' charging decisions on suspects, the operation of
so-called "no-fly" lists impacting Americans' air travel activities, 83 the
meager judicial scrutiny of discretion vested in government contrac-
tors engaged in quasi-official functions, 84 the enormous power federal
officials wield (even in the wake of recent Supreme Court decisions
on the subject) in designating enemy combatants,8 5 and even in the
myriad decisions governing federal procurement predicated on the
exercise of government officials' legal discretion. 86 How, then, should
courts and legislatures respond to perceived inadequacies in the de-
gree of external scrutiny for these decisions?
What courts and legislatures have not done is to move towards
maximally limiting discretion, by subjecting every decision to the type
of stringent review associated with de novo fact-finding. This courts
and legislatures are understandably loath to do in domains where they
perceive relatively broad executive discretion to have benefits, and
where they perceive judicial resources to be scarce. Instead, judges
and lawmakers tend to manage the costs and benefits of discretion by
varying the stringency of review that is supposed to apply to the ac-
tions of the executive or her agent. Whether courts are driven to do
this by anodyne judicial prudence or rigid legislative mandates, they
83 See Justin Florence, Note, Making the No Fly List ly: A Due Process Model for Ter-
rorist Watchlists, 115 YALE LJ. 2148, 2157-59 (2006).
84 See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization As Delegation, 103 COLuM. L. REV.
1367, 1400-10 (2003) (arguing that privatization would lessen judicial review); Steven
L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Stream-
lined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 549, 562-64 (2005) (discussing
the dangers of contractors who receive no guidance or management).
85 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004) (plurality opinion).
86 SeeJody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. Sr. U. L. REv. 155, 165 (2000)
(noting that, despite the "highly technocratic approach to contract design" prevalent
in federal procurement law, the existing framework is "too limited to address the
much more substantial issues that arise" in some contracts).
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review some decisions more stringently, and others less so.8 7 Even de-
cisions putatively subject to the same standard of review, such as the
familiar "arbitrary and capricious" touchstone enshrined in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, may end up being reviewed with different
degrees of stringency. The distinctions presumably reflect courts'
judgments about when the costs of added scrutiny are justified.8
Thus, judges and scholars generally take "arbitrary and capricious" re-
view to mean one thing (milder review) for a typical informal adjudi-
cation, such as deciding whether a vehicle fits standards permitting
entrance to a national forest, and another (more stringent review)
when courts are reviewing an intricate regulatory rule governing the
licensing of nuclear reactors.8 9
Stringency of review is what. distinguishes these two different ver-
sions of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Stringency is what
differentiates government decisions that receive greater judicial scru-
tiny from those that get less. The term is meant to serve as an abbrevi-
ated reference to the mixture of doctrines governing such distinctions
in the strictness of review applied to an agency's factual or prescriptive
conclusions in a given decision. The concept includes the standard of
review governing appeals of specific administrative actions. It is af-
fected by the degree of outright deference given to the executive
branch, and the extent to which courts find through constitutional or
statutory interpretation that a particular decision ought to be commit-
ted by law to agency discretion. More stringency can imply more rig-
orous procedures (such as those that might be imposed on due
process groups) that the government must follow before imposing a
cost on someone, a less permissive standard of review for the factual
findings of executive branch agencies (or lower courts), and less over-
all deference to the government's decision itself. Thus, when a court
87 See cases cited supra note 11.
88 Indeed, casual observers may be forgiven for assuming (heroically) that courts
(or legislatures, when they directly impose limits on review) are balancing the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of greater stringency of review. See infra Part I.D.2 for a
discussion.
89 See, e.g., SE(TION OF ADMIN. LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE, Am. BAR Ass'N, A
BLACKLETTER STATEMENT OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 34 (2004). The Blacketter
Statement provides a cogent and revealing synthesis:
The court may set aside an agency action as an abuse of discretion ...
on any of several grounds. In practice, application of these grounds varies
according to the nature and magnitude of the agency action. Thus, a court
will typically apply the criteria rigorously during judicial review of high-stakes
rulemaking proceedings (a practice commonly termed "hard look" review), but much
more leniently when reviewing a routine, uncomplicated action.
Id. (emphasis added).
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determines that a six-page declaration from an official ensconced be-
neath layers of the Defense Department bureaucracy is enough reason
to detain someone for an indefinite period of time, it is being more
deferential. 90 When a court decides such justification is insufficient,
because the executive must provide a "meaningful opportunity" for
someone so designated to get notice of the factual basis for their de-
tention and to contest their status, it is being less deferential.9 '
Though courts engage in review at different levels of stringency
depending on the statutory context and judgments about the feasibil-
ity of more intense scrutiny, their work across contexts tends to follow
a certain convention. When deciding how much of that power to let
executive authorities keep, courts and legislators tend to implicitly as-
sume that a particular degree of stringency in review will apply, once
articulated (and assuming it is actually followed), across the board to
all similarly situated cases. 92 In fact, courts treat horizontal equity as
an important value, where deviations must be defended.93 The same
goes for virtually all the legislative mandates that courts implement.
The move to privilege horizontal equity in judicial review is the es-
sence of traditional judicial review.94 Its rationale may be grounded in
an appreciation for stare decisis, or perhaps resides in an inflated con-
ception of judicial power to ensure that like cases are treated similarly.
90 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
91 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (plurality opinion).
92 For some examples from different regulatory contexts, see Bowen v. Mich.
Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 675 (1986) (discussing legislative reluctance
to tax judicial resources by allowing routine review of Medicare Part B claims); Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983) (noting, in the context of reviewing an alleged retali-
atory demotion and defamation claim against a federal official, that "[t]he costs asso-
ciated with the review of disciplinary decisions are already significant-not only in
monetary terms, but also in the time and energy of managerial personnel who must
defend their decisions"); Langevin v. Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296, 303 (2d
Cir. 1971) (finding that judicial review of the Federal Housing Agency's discretionary
actions resulting in rent increase approvals in part on the basis that an unacceptably
high number of rent increases would be subject to review). Here and in similar cases,
the court's discussion of costs assumes (either implicitly or explicitly) that whatever
costs are generated by the stringency of review the court adopts in the present case
will be applied to future cases with similar characteristics. See supra note 12 for exam-
ples of briefs making this argument.
93 See Cole, supra note 2, at 2567-77.
94 The reference to "traditional judicial review" implies that executive decisions
can be reviewed through judicial fora, where judges tend to believe that court deci-
sions governing how stringent the review of discretionary executive decisions is will
affect every future case (or nearly so) in a particular class, and where litigants seek,
and the court can deliver, some kind of relief, such as vacating a particular govern-
ment action or providing an injunctive remedy.
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Predictably, the desire for horizontal equity in standards governing
the stringency of review renders troubling (at least in the eyes of many
principled observers) the prospect of increasing the stringency of re-
view in a particular case. A decision to increase review stringency in a
single case is taken to cast a long shadow on all similar decisions in the
relevant pool of cases, and to prohibitively increase the associated
costs in terms of the direct burdens of review and the forgone benefits
of discretion. 95
D. Why Audits Could Serve as a Valuable Supplement to Traditional
Judicial Review
How might the legal system better manage the costs and benefits
of the high-discretion, low-review-stringency regime associated with ac-
tions committed to agency discretion or subject to highly deferential
review? Plainly, the answer depends on how one defines "better," a
point that will be taken up in earnest below. For the moment, imag-
ine that society fears mistakes in the exercise of executive discretion
but also seeks to harness expertise and conserve review resources. Im-
agine further that society has at its disposal some new amount of re-
sources that can be used either to expand slightly the scope or
stringency of traditional judicial review over highly discretionary activ-
ities, or in some other fashion. How else might those resources be
used?
1. The Role of Audits in Overseeing Complex Organizations
One answer can be found in what government organizations re-
peatedly do to the public: they audit.96 As the term is used here, an
audit of executive discretion is a stringent evaluation of a sample of
discrete decisions drawn randomly from a larger pool, using an ex-
plicit standard fixed in advance, with the results announced to the
public. 97 Its aim is to uncover, for each reviewed case, whether a par-
95 Cf CASs R. SUNSTEIN, AFrER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 219 (1990) ("lAin un-
duly aggressive judicial posture may increase delays and paperwork in a way that
threatens implementation.").
96 Robust ombuds systems, such as those used in Scandinavian countries, may
represent another alternative. Nonetheless, if an ombuds system functioned as it is
traditionally understood in being driven by public complaints, it would have some of
the same strengths and weaknesses that the litigation process would, and would
thereby provide a somewhat distorted picture of bureaucratic activity.
97 Each of these features interacts to give the proposal developed here its unique
characteristics. (1) Random selection assures a representative picture of decisions
and provides a mixed strategy approach to deterrence that is difficult to evade. See
infra Part II.A. (2) Fixing some standard in advance reduces risk-normalization dy-
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ticular discretionary decision is in accord with some defensible stan-
dard grounded in public representations of the executive branch,
implicit in statutes or constitutional doctrine, or defined by the audi-
tor in advance.
In contrast to financial or more wide-ranging program manage-
ment audits, the audits of executive discretion envisioned here treat
each discretionary decision, such as a decision to label a group as a
specially designated terrorist organization, as the unit of analysis.98
Audits of executive discretion would evaluate the information sup-
porting the decision, its origins and reliability, contradictory informa-
tion, and the broader context in which the decision took place. Even
in instances where the population of cases from which a sample could
be drawn is relatively small, audits have the potential to "increase the
information extracted from [an organization's] own limited historical
experience by treating unique historical incidents as detailed stories
rather than single data points."99 Though existing audits rarely take
precisely the form I suggest here, the basic idea of using audits to
learn what's going on in the world is neither mysterious nor rare.
Audits associated with taxation are among the most common.
They take place in some form in most reliable tax collection sys-
tems.' 00 Many tax audits are not entirely random, which reduces their
ability to provide a reliable picture of public behavior. The less ran-
dom the audits are, the less generalizable their results-and the easier
it might be to evade them by avoiding the behaviors that raise the
probability of being audited.101 From this perspective, one of the
"purest" tax auditing programs in recent years (in the sense of being
namics described by scholars of bureaucracy, making it more likely that problems will
be detected by audit bureaucracies that are not immune from the organizational and
political problems affecting the agencies they are auditing. See infra note 136 and
accompanying text (discussing Vaughan's work on the "normalization of risk"). (3)
Public announcement (including provisions for protecting classified information) al-
lows audits to play a role in a larger system of accountability defined by representative
politics and public reactions. See infra Part l.D.
98 Hence, the audits of executive discretion discussed here differ from the more
informal program evaluation audits often undertaken by the GAO and Inspectors
General. The incentives of federal audit bureaucracies to perform different types of
audits are discussed infra Part IV.
99 James G. March et at., Learning From Samples of One or Fewer, 2 ORG. Sci. 1, 2
(1991).
100 See generally JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OuRSELVEs 180-82 (3d ed.
2004) (discussing how the IRS performs audits).
101 This last point is at the core of the explanation for why a "mixed strategy" is so
valuable in the framework of game theory. See DAVID A. KREPs, A COURSE IN
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 381-83 (1990).
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almost entirely random) was the Internal Revenue Service's Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP)o102 The following discus-
sion emphasizes the tremendous informational value of such a
program:
The last thorough tax gap study was for the year 1992, based on
the 1988 TCMP. Noncompliance with individual and corporate in-
come taxes was estimated to cost the Treasury about 18 percent of
actual tax liability, which at 2002 levels of revenue would have
amounted to $223 billion. An average tax rate of 22 percent implies
that there is about $1 trillion of unreported income and illegitimate
deductions.10 3
Without TCMP audits, the federal government is unable to figure
out the size of the "tax gap." The program's cancellation has limited
the government's ability to know how much is paid relative to what is
owed, and who is particularly likely to be responsible for that gap. 10 4
Audits also play a role in regulatory enforcement and court pro-
ceedings, such as when federal health care regulators and investiga-
tors suspect a health care clinic or nursing home of overcharging the
federal government on Medicare payments. The government sends in
investigators. Instead of figuring out the amount the clinic owes by
reviewing each one of its files, investigators occasionally use audits to
calculate the amount. 10 5 Courts reviewing this practice have repeat-
edly endorsed it, finding neither a conflict with the statute nor one
with due process.' 0 6 "Sample audits" also make an occasional appear-
ance in class actions. When they do, courts confronted with an entire
class of claims benefit from examining a sample of those claims to
gauge the merits of the suit.'0 7
Private markets have made audits even more of a fixture. Admin-
istrators frequently deploy auditing techniques in the internal moni-
toring of private sector organizations, where the warning that "your
call may be monitored for quality assurance" has become ubiquitous.
Hierarchical organizations facing market pressures are riven with in-
formation problems. Managers may learn something about their sub-
ordinates' performance from market responses. But these
102 SLEMROD & BAIjI.A, supra note 100, at 174.
103 Id. at 175.
104 Id. ("[T]he estimates are based on data that is now over fifteen years old. But
these are the best numbers around.").
105 See Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 914, 915 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
106 Id. at 916.
107 See, e.g., McComber v. Travelers Prop. & Cas., 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 349, 350-51
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2004).
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responses-commonly driven by a host of factors external to the or-
ganization-yield an inexact picture of performance, and waiting for
market responses can risk the organization's well-being.° 8 Audits are
a response in a world of scarce resources. The point of such audits is
not immediately to stop abuses or mistakes in discrete cases. It is to
enable greater learning about what happens to the hundreds or
thousands of individuals interacting with a company's workers, and
how those interactions can be improved. Insurance companies some-
times perform a process of "closed file review," where they spend
more money figuring out whether the amount of money paid out for
a particular insurance claim was correctly calculated than they do pay-
ing out the claim itself.10 9 It is not difficult to see why managers
would rather know more about how their employees are performing.
Nor is it surprising that random audits (at least when they happen
with a sufficiently high probability) make it harder for the people or
organizations being overseen to evade detection. I1 0
Organizational leaders value audits for a reason. Audits mitigate
the problem, common to private organizations and public agencies
regulating private behavior, of learning how individuals are actually
functioning in an inherently complex and unpredictable environ-
ment. Indeed, if regulators avoided random auditing techniques alto-
gether, they would face at least two problems. Existing knowledge
about where problems lie may prove deficient or outdated. Perhaps
more important, strategic actors can simply evade review by avoiding
domains where enforcement is already occurring. Recognizing the
possibility of strategic action to evade monitoring, the Supreme Court
lauded random enforcement in United States v. Biswell.I' One after-
noon, a pawn shop owner who was federally licensed to deal in sport-
ing firearms was surprised to find a Treasury agent arrive to inspect
the premises. 112 In holding that the Treasury agent could do so with-
out a warrant, the majority observed that:
108 Cf ALBERT O, HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LoYALIv 24-25 (1970) (discussing
the risks to organizations of obtaining performance signals by simply waiting for mar-
ket-driven "exit" responses among customers, employees, or other constituencies).
109 See J. David Cummins & Sharon Tennyson, Controlling Automobile Insurance
Costs, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1992, at 95, 110-11. For a more general discussion of
the value of, and incentives for use of, audits in the private sector, see Ross L. Watts &
Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evi-
dence, 26J.L. & ECON. 613, 626-33 (1983).
110 See KREps, supra note 101, at 763-64.
111 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
112 Id. at 312.
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[I]f inspection is to be effective and serve as a credible deterrent,
unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this con-
text, the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection;
and if the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency is to
be preserved, the protections afforded by a warrant would be
negligible.113
Although the Supreme Court was describing the needs of federal
regulatory bureaucracies overseeing the public, it could just as well
have been describing the needs of legislators overseeing the bureau-
cracy. Not surprisingly, legislators have created several bureaucracies
capable of using auditing techniques to investigate what government
agencies actually do with their discretion. Occasionally, government
agencies audit the performance of their own workers."14 The Govern-
ment Accountability Office (originally the General Accounting Of-
fice) was created early in the twentieth century primarily to help
Congress monitor the financial activities of the executive branch.1 1 5
In 1974, legislators gave the GAO power to review and analyze the
implementation of government programs.116 Shortly thereafter, be-
ginning in the middle of the 1970s and continuing over the next ten
years or so, legislators began creating "Inspector General" offices in
the federal government.1 1 7 Like the GAO, the Inspectors General
have the legal power to investigate how federal officials use their
targeted discretion. The existence of these structures indicates the
potentially important role that audits can play in shaping how the fed-
eral government uses its targeted discretion. Whether these bureau-
cracies actually perform such audits is another matter, discussed
below. 8
How might audits be used in contexts where traditional review
treats an executive decision as essentially committed to agency discre-
tion, or subject to exceedingly deferential, low-stringency review? Im-
agine a world much like our own, where only some decisions are
113 Id. at 316.
114 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
note (2000) (subjecting numerous categories of federal employees to random drug
tests); Editorial, Guilty UntilProven Innocent, N.Y. TmEs,,Jan. 20, 2006, at A16 (describ-
ing how the IRS Office of the Taxpayer Advocate audited a random sample of 500 tax
returns where refunds had been frozen and taxpayers complained, and found that
sixty-six percent of taxpayers deserved a full refund and another fourteen percent
deserved a partial refund).
115 See John T. Rourke, The GAO: An Evolving Role, 38 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 453,
453-54 (1978).
116 Id. at 455.
117 See PAUL LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT 42 (1993).
118 See infra Part 111.
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subject to stringent judicial review, and others are subject to less strin-
gent review. For fairly obvious reasons, political 
principals (such as
legislators) desire to know how the government is using its discretion.
But constraints exist in the form of a limited budget 
to review deci-
sions, and concerns about over-deterring the executive 
branch. Ear-
lier I noted that a key feature of judicial review is that courts 
and
legislators tend to pick a standard of deference 
that is supposed to
apply to all cases in a particular class. What 
audits do is to introduce
an alternative means of review that allows for variation 
in both the stan-
dard of deference used to review cases as well as 
the number of cases
actually reviewed. In exchange for reviewing fewer 
cases, whoever is
conducting the audits can demand more evidence 
from the executive
branch, more justification, and more access to information-all 
at a
lower cost than what would be incurred if the same 
standard of defer-
ence applied to every decision.
119
An audit of discretionary executive branch decisions 
would un-
fold in three steps. First, an auditor would define 
some discrete set of
targeted decisions to analyze (i.e., all summary exclusions at 
the bor-
der, all enemy combatant designations, all occupational 
safety admin-
istrative compliance orders, or all decisions to 
prosecute or not to
prosecute case referrals from law enforcement 
agencies regarding
mail fraud). The auditor would randomly choose some number 
or
percentage of decisions to audit. Second, those 
decisions would be
reviewed far more stringently than a court would 
review the full po-
tential class of decisions. If a court (as with border inspection 
deci-
sions) provides almost no review, the auditor would 
gather all
available information about how the decision took 
place, what its ef-
fect was, what the secondary inspector knew when he denied 
entry,
and what other agencies know that might be relevant 
to the decision.
If a court reviews IEEPA designations under a highly 
permissive ver-
sion of the "arbitrary and capricious" and "substantial evidence" 
tests,
the auditor would instead gather information on 
how an administra-
tive record was compiled-not just on what it purports to say. In 
do-
ing so, the auditor would apply a standard either 
drawn in advance
from the purposes of the statutes in question, 
or perhaps even based
on the executive branch's own assertions about 
the goals it seeks to
119 The proposal is, therefore, somewhat reminiscent 
of one that Mashaw offered
for social security benefit determinations 
in the concluding pages of his exhaustive
study of the Social Security Administration. 
See JERRY L. MASHAW, BuREAUCRATICJLSJ
TICE 226 (1983).
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accomplish through the 'audited discretionary decision.' 20 Intelli-
gence information, reviewed in camera, could be used in these deter-
minations.1 21 Third, the results of the audit would be made available
to legislators and the public, a development that could (under certain
conditions) help pressure the agency to, make modifications in its
conduct.
Relying on public responses introduces some uncertainty about
an audit's impact. The effect of this institutional mechanism depends
on whether legislators and the public react to the audits. While both
might sometimes ignore those results, the media's reaction to GAO
and Inspector General reports suggests that audits could prove to be
salient. 22 Judicial review would continue in the background at
whatever standard of deference courts and legislatures choose. Judges
might even evaluate executive clamoring for deference by weighing
whether a reliable audit system is in place, and other courts might
approach their cases differently as a result of what the audits revealed.
Although audits would not necessarily provide relief to every ag-
grieved person or group, they would help legislators, organized inter-
est groups, and the public to learn far more about what government
does than is currently known.' 23
2. The Risks of Tolerating the Amount of Discretion Associated
with Traditional Judicial Review
Why would such knowledge prove valuable? The first part of the
answer will require us to retrace the most commonly asserted argu-
ments for expansive discretion. By juxtaposing them against the risks
of discretion, we can better identify the problems that arise from toler-
ating the amount of open-ended bureaucratic flexibility associated
with traditional judicial review.
120 For instance, in the criminal context, the auditor's determination of a standard
would be shaped by statements of prosecutors regarding the purposes of the prosecu-
tions. See infra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
121 Cf United States v. Isa, 923 F.2d 1300, 1306 (8th Cir. 1991) (using in camera
review of information obtained by federal agents through wiretaps authorized under
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and denying aggrieved party's motion for
suppression); JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILIv 105-14 (1993) (discussing
how fear of leaking is overblown).
122 See infra Part III.A.
123 Depending on the assumptions made about the political system, legislators and
the public might respond to the audits in ways that would provide relief to all or some
of the people aggrieved by problematic applications of targeted executive discretion.
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a. Arguments for Expansive Discretion and Their Contingent
Nature
Given the allegedly intimate link between accountability and
court review, departures from a baseline of stringent review presuma-
bly should be contingent on a satisfactory accounting of the benefits
from such a move. So what are the benefits? A fairly obvious one is
the speed with which a discretionary decision can be made. More re-
view introduces delay in at least two ways: by providing incentives for
executive branch decisionmakers to engage in greater analysis or de-
liberation before a decision is made (ex ante), and by potentially de-
laying the point at which a decision can be fully implemented until
review is completed (ex post). Some decisions need to be made
quickly if they are going to matter. Suppose policymakers confront a
possible outbreak of avian flu virus. They may consider imposing a
quarantine. They must decide quickly whether American airports will
receive flights from the affected country. To delay the decision effec-
tively becomes a decision to let the planes land. Even if it is possible
to wait, it may cost a lot to do so. The Treasury can wait to freeze a
suspicious charity's assets, but those assets may soon leave the group's
coffers for some tropical island bank secrecy haven. Letting executive
authorities have discretion lets them not only decide quickly-the
saved time can translate into money, extra safety, and convenience.
The point is not lost on courts reviewing many of the federal govern-
ment's national security decisions.1 24 Nor is it lost on courts and
scholars writing about other aspects of public law-such as those con-
cerned about the "ossification" of regulatory rules.125 On a related
note, less review also saves two kinds of resources: those the court or
other reviewing authority would expend on analyzing a case, and
those that the government would spend defending itself. These costs
are likely to be especially salient because courts, relying on some ver-
sion of stare decisis or horizontal equity norms, assume they are fash-
ioning a standard that will apply to all (or nearly all) similar cases. 126
The argument for discretion in such cases often exalts exper-
tise. 1 27 The conventional wisdom is that agencies and the executive
124 See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 271 F.3d 21, 30-35 (Ist Cir.
2001).
125 See CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAMNG 174 (3d ed. 2003); see also McGarity, supra
note 35, at 21-23 (discussing the effect of judicial review on agencies' willingness to
use regulatory authority).
126 See supra Part 1.C.
127 See Perez v. FBI, 71 F.3d 513, 514 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995). But see N. Jersey Media
Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2002).
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branch have greater specialized technical competence than the judges
who might review their decisions. Given its perceived intellectual ped-
igree, this justification recurs in judicial decisions in a wide range of
domains, regardless of whether the subject is medical evaluation of
disability claims, military planning, or evaluation of chemical data. 128
No doubt that expertise is valuable. The more some reviewing author-
ity intervenes, the greater the risk that expert decisions will be un-
done. More intervention may even dilute the incentives of
decisionmakers to develop and use expertise, or innovate in desirable
ways that may not immediately inspire public confidence. 129 Discre-
tion may also have a role in helping government harmonize compet-
ing goals, trading off some desired goals against further delays (for
example) in achieving policy objectives considered less compelling. 130
In the same vein, supporters of executive discretion accept bold
suppositions about executive branch accountability to bolster their
case. Accountability is surely a contestable and often ambiguous con-
cept. But scholarly references to it appear to encompass, at a mini-
mum, the idea that the public should be able to assign responsibility
for government decisions and to force decisionmakers to bear a cost
when those decisions are not acceptable. In an ironic twist, the rheto-
ric of accountability that so often bolsters arguments for stringent ju-
dicial review sometimes serves precisely the opposite goal. The
argument proceeds along the following lines. The less that court (or
other external) intervention encroaches on the executive's domain,
the more that legislators, organized interest groups and the larger
public can focus on rewarding or punishing the executive (or the in-
ferior officer) for her decisions. 13' This position implies not only a
reluctance to see courts throw sand in the gears of some hypothetical
scheme for accountability, but a confidence that an accounting will
indeed be rendered to either superior officers or the public. Thus
courts observe (as did this one in declining to engage in review of
prosecutorial discretion) that "while this discretion is subject to abuse
128 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048 (1984); Vt. Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-48 (1978).
129 Cf KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION 265 (1991)
(arguing that "informational concerns-in the sense of how politicians can be pro-
vided with incentives to study public problems and formulate public policy-are at
the heart of legislative organization").
130 See Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 533-34 (6th Cir. 2004).
131 See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is
.... "); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59
(1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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or misuse just as is judicial discretion, deviations from [the prosecu-
tor's] duty as an agent of the Executive are to be dealt with by his
superiors."' 12
b. The Risks Associated with Expansive Discretion
The arguments extolling discretion have a grain of truth. What
they do not address is how much-and how easily-discretion can be
abused, whether the context is social security benefit payments, bor-
der screening, enemy combatant designations, or prosecutorial en-
forcement. Consider, for example, what could be called the "learning
costs" problem. Executive branch bureaucracies and the people who
work in them spend their days (ostensibly) carrying out legal man-
dates. People who work there do that in part by relying on expertise.
They hone that expertise by learning from their environment, and
correcting their mistakes. But if no external authority monitors the
bureaucracy, then those who work there may be unwilling or unable
to learn much of anything. In fact, several scholars have suggested
that external court review helps bureaucratic institutions learn.I 3 But
that belief is not always fully explained, and court review carries con-
comitant risks of over-deterring executive branch activity. No doubt
sometimes an inspector's good conscience or an agency's strong inter-
nal culture contribute to reasonable decisions about what assets to
freeze or who should be labeled an enemy combatant. Nonetheless, it
is certainly plausible to assume that such desirable circumstances do
not always arise, and that judicial review helps create conditions that
foster learning.
Four separate but interrelated reasons support this claim. First, a
substantial body of research suggests that people learn when they have
reason to do so.' 3 4 Other things being equal, the dilution of review
may deprive individuals in public bureaucracies of reasons to learn (at
least, limits on review may disrupt public officials' incentives to learn
with the same intensity that they would if review were more stringent).
This assumes, quite plausibly, that a review process turning up mis-
takes can be embarrassing to people, or that people in the agency may
otherwise suffer some costs if they face some kind of review process
132 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
133 See, e.g., MASHAW & HArsT, supra note 35, at 111-23 (using the example of
NHTSA to show that agencies react to judicial review).
134 See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA 101-48
(1998).
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that does not go well.' 35 Second, organizations develop routines that
blind them. As Diane Vaughan wrote in her study of the Challenger
launch decision:
Possibly the most significant lesson from the Challenger case is how
environmental and organizational contingencies create prerational
forces that shape worldview, normalizing signals of potential dan-
ger, resulting in mistakes with harmful human consequences. The
explanation of the Challenger launch is a story of how people who
worked together developed patterns that blinded them to the con-
sequences of their actions. It is not only about the development of
norms but about the incremental expansion of normative bounda-
ries: how small changes-new behaviors that were slight deviations
from the normal course of events-gradually became the norm,
providing a basis for accepting additional deviance. No rules were
violated; there was no intent to do harm. Yet harm was done.t 36
External review may elucidate things that people inside the or-
ganization fail to appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite,
but precisely because of, the absence of expertise. Which means that
even if discretion plays a vital role in creating the incentives for people
to gather expertise and for other reasons discussed previously, its
abundance may diminish opportunities for learning from mistaken
enemy combatant designations, border inspection decisions, asset
freezing determinations, and health or safety inspections. The most
attractive kinds of organizational learning-where the organization
learns to achieve important goals better and more efficiently-is likely
to be rarely encountered, if in fact it is encountered at all.1 37 Water-
ing down or forgoing judicial review altogether leaves the problem of
how agencies will learn from their mistakes, and indeed, how agencies
will even realize that they have made a mistake. 38
135 This is certainly true in the case of people who work in offices whose broad
performance is reviewed by the Inspectors General or the GAO. See infra Part IIILA.
136 DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAuNcH DECISION 409-10 (1996) (emphasis
added).
137 See March et al., supra note 99, at 2-3; Michal Tamuz, Learning Disabilities for
Regulators: The Perils of Organizational Learning in the Air Transportation Industry, 33 Ar-
MIN. & Soc'v 276, 295-99 (2001).
138 See MASHAw & HAREST, supra note 35, at 111-23, for a discussion of how a
regulatory agency (in that case, NHTSA) learned to use alternative policymaking
strategies to avoid the costs associated with judicial review. The example serves to
emphasize two points, both of which are relevant to the present discussion: (1) that
agencies appear to react to judicial review, and (2) that organizational learning is not
necessarily associated with learning to achieve the most valuable organizational goals
better. Learning can be a bad thing; no doubt that organizations making large num-
bers of discretionary decisions that rarely if ever get reviewed (or, if reviewed, rarely
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Large grants of discretion can have at least two other problematic
consequences. In some cases, executive branch officials may succumb
to the temptation to use their discretion to create an appealing im-
pression among the public. I discuss this problem at greater length
elsewhere, 139 but the basic insight is a simple one. Executive authori-
ties face fewer checks in the domain of discretionary action than in
traditional regulatory or criminal justice realms. Accordingly, discre-
tionary actions can serve as a sort of signal that the public (or political
superiors) can use in forming judgments about the competence of the
executive branch (or an organization within it). As long as the pub-
lic's impressions of the executive branch's expertise, success, ability,
and resolve are influenced in part by discretionary actions, then those
actions will become tempting levers to create favorable public percep-
tions. Frozen assets and specially designated terrorist organizations
send the message that the executive branch knows what it is doing. It
may not. This state of affairs may skew citizens' ability to evaluate the
effectiveness of their own government. And the discretionary actions
may themselves have costs, including the creation of perverse incen-
tives for regulated groups, °40 diminished compliance with treaties, or
simply the mistreatment suffered by individual detainees (for exam-
ple) whose weeks as enemy combatants became months and then
years before ending (at least for some) in freedom. There is, finally,
the specter of more deliberate transgressions. Just as discretion allows
political authorities to engage in subtle, politically motivated self-deal-
ing, it can also lead to some employees engaging in blatant, willful
malfeasance. 1 41
When stalwart defenders of executive discretion come close to ac-
knowledging these realities, their most frequent move is to invoke a
political process that is rarely expressly defined. They are obviously
right to recognize how public organizations exist in a larger political
context. But assuming that such a context will reliably and consist-
ently counterbalance the tendencies I have just described requires ac-
cepting heroic assumptions. Even if voters often behaved relatively
rationally as the term is conventionally understood in modern politi-
cal science, the results of the political game are endogenous to the
get scrutinized carefully) probably learn that they can shift resources, time, attention,
quality control, and strict adherence to legal or aspirational goals away from those
decisions and towards other pursuits. The question is how to encourage the most
desirable kinds of learning.
139 See Mariano-Florentino CuaIlar, The Mismatch Between State Power and State Ca-
pacity in Transnational Law Enforcement, 22 BERKELEV J. INT'L L. 15, 44-48 (2004).
140 See id. at 49-53.
141 See THE ABu GHRI-B INVESTIGATIONS 1-20 (Steven Strasser ed., 2004).
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information available. Agency relationships change in response to
what the players come to know, even if-to paraphrase former Secre-
tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld-voters know what they do not
know. 142
A more plausible assumption can, be grounded in the extensive
behavioral research tradition in mid-to-late twentieth-century political
science, suggesting that voters often do not know what they do not
know.' 43 One might even question the electorate's distribution of its
scarce cognitive attention, as there is no particularly good reason to
think that voters come to focus on the facets of law or policy that they
should, even if we use their own consistently expressed and stable val-
ues as a benchmark. 44 These limitations constrain the electorate's
capacity to provide a bulwark against bureaucratic failure. And they
explain, among other things, why legislators themselves often do just
fine not only if they ignore festering problems of bureaucratic compe-
tence,145 but if they deliberately create them. 146 The point is not that
electoral checks are irrelevant. It's that they are not entirely reliable,
and they are often dependent on some mechanism-like judicial re-
view-to focus public attention and produce information for it.
In effect, bureaucracies should frequently be expected to face
pressures to render poor decisions, unless they are subjected to con-
142 See Hart Seely, The Poety of D.H. Rumsfeld, SLATE, Apr. 2, 2003, http://www.
slate.com/id/2081042.
143 See, e.g., LupiA & MCCUBRINS, supra note 134, at 17-38 (1998) (emphasizing
citizens' limited knowledge about politics); Richard R. Lau & David P. Redlawsk, Vot-
ing Correctly, 91 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 585, 587-93 (1997) (using survey data to construct
a statistical model estimating the proportion of voters that vote "correctly" given their
attitudes and impressions, and finding that one-in-four voters voted incorrectly in the
five American presidential elections between 1972 and 1988).
144 Cf Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Rethinking Regulatoy Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L.
REv. 411, 412-16 (2005) (finding that comments made by citizens during the notice
and comment phase of a new administrative regulation were less likely to be incorpo-
rated into the final regulation than comments made by administrative attorneys be-
cause the citizens' comments lacked technical sophistication even though they
offered constructive insights relevant to the agencies' legal mandates).
145 See Kenneth E. Scott & Barry R. Weingast, Banking Reform: Economic Propellants,
Political Impediments, in REFORMING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS IN THE
UNITED STATES 19, 27-36 (George G. Kaufman ed., 1994).
146 See Barry R. Weingast, Caught in the Middle: The President, Congress, and the Politi-
cal-Bureaucratic System, in THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 312, 338 (Joel D. Aberbach & Mark
A. Peterson eds., 2005) ("Bureaucracy is a pejorative term in modern America, and
rightly so.... The political compromises necessitated by the American constitutional
system mean that legislation rarely attacks problems in a straightforward manner, but
typically through political compromise that combines multiple and conflicting goals
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straints that nudge them in more promising directions. Those con-
straints depend, in turn, on the public availability of information
about bureaucratic performance. Once the executive discretion prob-
lem is thus recast, it becomes plain how audits can often generate
such valuable information. Under marginal cost analysis, if the costs
of review only apply to a small fraction of cases, more stringent review
is possible for that random subset of cases. Willful malfeasance will be
harder to conceal, and (more generally) mistakes that would simply
not appear under deferential judicial review may emerge, regardless
of whether they involve compliance orders, passenger prescreening
procedures, or other forms of administrative action. 147 In short,
courts may find justification for avoiding intrusion into some domains
of executive power on the basis of broad separation of powers or re-
lated political question rationales . 4 But the consequentialist case for
limiting review of many routine executive branch decisions must con-
tend with two realities that weaken the case for unfettered executive
discretion: (1) the pervasive risks of bureaucratic mistakes or malfea-
sance, and (2) the fact that review mechanisms such as audits may
provide valuable new information about executive performance with-
out incurring the range of costs that traditional judicial review would.
3. A Social Welfare-Oriented Case for Auditing Executive
Discretion
The preceding discussion about the risks of expansive discretion
should tend to support the intuition that audits could improve on
what traditional judicial review provides. We now turn to providing
some analytical support for the intuition by considering a social wel-
fare-oriented justification for audits in a politically uncomplicated
147 This assumes, plausibly, that for most domains the gains from greater strin-
gency in review of the limited sample of cases outweighs cursory review of all cases in
a particular class (which is already available, in most cases, with existing deferential
forms ofjudicial review). Even ifjudicial review is entirely precluded, stringent review
of a small sample may prove vastly more informative than dividing a scarce review
budget among an entire pool of potential cases. For instance, a non-linear function
mapping stringency to a given probability of discovering problems may doom defer-
ential review to uncover nothing; meanwhile, a small percentage sample of a larger
population may reveal almost as much as review of the entire population. See infra
Part Il.B for an elaboration of the last point.
148 In any event, some observers suggest the political question doctrine itself is
becoming increasingly irrelevant. For an insightful discussion of the doctrine's evolu-
tion, its relative decline, and the extent to which its theoretical bases are compelling,
see Barkow, supra note 2. As Part L.B notes, no similar growth in judicial assertiveness
is discernible in judicial supervision of more routine instances of executive discretion.
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world, where traditional judicial review limits agents' ability to opti-
mally police the exercise of executive discretion.
The potential value of audits is readily apparent 
if one makes the
heroic assumption that elaborate analyses of marginal 
costs and bene-
fits in fact determine standards of stringency governing 
a pool of po-
tential cases. Assume for a moment, therefore, 
that legislators and
courts have appropriately weighed the costs and 
benefits of reviewing
a certain kind of decision at a particular degree 
of stringency. They
have decided, for example, that orders freezing 
assets should get
nothing more than highly deferential arbitrary 
and capricious review.
Even if conscientious courts and legislators 
think of this degree of
stringency as the best way to strike a balance among 
competing con-
cerns, they may still recognize that there is an 
unfortunate byproduct
of this choice of stringency level. Specifically, 
some types of errors
associated with these decisions can only be detected 
if review is more
stringent than at present. When people engage 
in deliberate wrongs,
for example, they tend to make efforts to hide 
their misconduct. In
effect, the function mapping stringency of review 
to probability of de'
tecting mistakes or manipulation can be radically 
discontinuous, in
which case it may be better to manage the costs 
of review by reviewing
fewer cases more thoroughly. It is precisely the 
trade-off social scien-
tists make when they consider whether to allocate 
scarce resources to
getting a larger sample or to investigate 
their cases more pro-
foundly, 149 and that courts themselves occasionally 
make when they
cautiously use samples of claims in a class, or 
health care reimburse-
ment requests to learn more in the 
litigation process
.150
The argument for audits can be framed more 
explicitly by focus-
ing on whether new resources available for reviewing 
executive discre-
tion should be used to expand judicial review or to conduct 
audits of
executive discretion. Recall that external review 
(from courts or oth-
erwise) is subject to various types of resource constraints. Those 
con-
straints arise from the direct cost of review,
1 51 the resources consumed
by the executive branch in responding to review,
152 and the risks of
149 See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text (emphasizing 
the potential
value, in social research design, of using scarce 
resources to generate more informa-
tion about individual cases rather than increasing 
sample size).
150 See supra text accompanying notes 105-07 
(discussing instances of sample
adjudication).
151 See supra note 92 (referencing cases discussing 
the costs of review).
152 See supra note 12 (referencing federal government 
arguments discussing the
dangers associated with consuming executive 
branch resources during the course of
the review process).
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over-deterring desirable executive branch activity. 5- Given the scar-
city of resources for review, imagine for simplicity that courts and leg-
islators have used marginal cost analysis to optimally balance review
stringency for all (actual or potential) cases arising in a particular class
expected to arise at any point during a given time period. 5 4 And
imagine further that additional resources (in the amount of R) be-
come available to defray all of the aforementioned costs of review.
How should they be deployed?
While no such question can be answered in a vacuum, some use-
ful insights emerge if we make some additional (stylized but plausible)
assumptions. First, audits-as the term is used here-involve random
selection of relevant discretionary decisions for review from a total
pool of decisions made in a given time period.1 55 Moreover, the ex-
pected costs of review of all eligible cases under traditional judicial
review in a given time period are higher than for audits. In marginal
cost and benefit terms, as Figure 1 shows, with audits the costs of re-
view rise more slowly as stringency rises because they apply to only a
fraction of the total pool of (actual or potential) cases litigated. This
property of audits allows the optimal degree of stringency to be
higher for cases audited than for cases subject to traditional judicial
review.
153 Cf PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 59-81 (1983) (analyzing the over-
deterrence problem in the context of damage actions against the government).
154 Court opinions often include references to the efficiency of the particular de-
gree of stringency they have chosen (or the legislature has) for a given class of cases.
See supra note 92. But courts may fail at conducting the analysis. They may be con-
cerned about workload pressures to a degree that overwhelms more nuanced evalua-
tion of marginal costs and benefits. Cf Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORN.ELL L. REv. 641, 693-95 (1987) (discuss-
ing the disjuncture between judicial workload concerns and the actual extent of litiga-
tion involving constitutional torts). They may fail to analyze the full range of benefits
and costs associated with more (or less) stringent review. Cf Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 885, 890 (2003)
(arguing that theories of interpretation that ignore institutional capacities and the
dynamic effects of any particular approach to interpretation are inadequate). In any
case, the argument for audits developed above is strengthened when it turns out that
courts and legislatures fail at balancing marginal costs and benefits when fixing the
level of stringency for a particular class of cases.
155 For a discussion of sample size, see infra Part II.B.
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FIGURE 1. OPTIMAL STRINGENCY UNDER AUDITS AND
TRADITIONAL REVIEW
Traditional Judicial Review Audits
Cost/benefit axis Cost/benefit axis
MarginalMribeefit / . Marginal
benefitt
Marginal cost
..................... ...
Stringency of review axis Stringency of review axis
Second, for any individual case reviewed, the probability of dis-
covering problems increases as a function of stringency of review.
That is, the harder a reviewer looks, the greater the chance she will
discover a problem with a discretionary decision if there is one.- 6 But
there is an additional complexity, arising from variations in the shape
of the function representing the relationship between review strin-
gency and problem detection. The importance of this function
should be reflected in any principled analysis of the marginal benefits
of review. As Figure 2 indicates, the stringency-problem detection
function may be linear, logarithmic, or sigmoid. Variations presuma-
bly depend on context: willful malfeasance should tend to be associ-
ated with a sigmoid (s-shaped) function, because of perpetrators'
efforts to cover their tracks, thereby making it possible to discover
problems only after considerable stringency is used to review a deci-
sion. For decisions having a sigmoid stringency-problem detection
probability curve, the probability of discovering problems under
highly deferential review may be essentially zero-a condition that is
likely to change only with relatively large increases in review
stringency.
156 For a discussion of what standard a reviewer would apply in an environment
where discretion is often defined precisely by the absence of standards, see infra Part
IC.
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Third, there is a distinctive social benefit (call it an "adjudicatory"
benefit) associated with the use of resources for traditional judicial
review (as opposed to audits) because of the special role that process
plays in resolving individual disputes in addition to generating infor-
mation. 5 7 The benefit varies depending on whether the new review
resources are likely to correct instances where litigants have suffered
without justification as a result of an executive branch discretionary
decision.
FiGURE 2. DIFFERENT STRINGENCY- PROBLEM DETECTION CURVES
Linear Logarithmic Sigmoid
Problem
Detection
Probability
Axis
Stringency of Review
Fourth, we assume there is relative social consensus regarding the
broad goals associated with lodging discretion for the type of decision
in question within the executive bureaucracy. Difficulties arise be-
cause achieving those goals requires both the detection of errors by
bureaucracies and flexibility allowing executive branch officials to ap-
ply expertise in specific circumstances. Nonetheless, the extent of
consensus regarding overall goals in this context is reflected in a sta-
ble majoritarian coalition of legislators and relevant executive branch
officials (though neither the goals in question nor particular interpre-
tations of what states of the world achieve those goals are necessarily
shared by everyone). We relax this assumption below.
Because we have assumed only R new resources, the specific ques-
tion is when it makes sense to allocate these resources to audits rather
than traditional judicial review, and assume for simplicity that this is
an all or nothing, binary choice (though nothing critical turns on
this). In an ideal world, that choice ought to depend on several fac-
tors that are important to optimize limited review resources. One crit-
157 This property also generates its own costs, and litigants may face a variety of
standing, redressability, and remedy-related hurdles if they choose to litigate their
cases. But for simplicity, these details need not be addressed here,
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ical factor is the type of stringency-problem detection curve most
common in a particular context, and where the status quo fits in rela-
tion to that curve. Suppose again we are dealing with a sigmoid curve.
As Figure 3 shows, if the optimal stringency of review under tradi-
tional judicial review before the new resources are added is associated
with a low point on the problem-detection axis, then the new re-
sources are likely to do very little for traditional judicial review. The
available resources must be divided across all cases in a particular
class, making it unlikely that the problem-detection probability will
rise much. Other critical factors include the value of additional infor-
mation generated from reviewing all cases instead of a sample of
them, and the "adjudicatory" benefit that might arise if resources
spent on adjudication materially change the probability that litigants
will be able to address problems associated with discretionary deci-
sions that have aggrieved them.
In a world with the aforementioned characteristics, the case for
spending the resources on traditional judicial review instead of audits
turns out to be a difficult one. As is almost certainly the case in the
real world, we have assumed that stringency-problem detection curves
vary depending on the context. Only rarely will they be of the precise
shape necessary to render pivotal the small (if not tiny) increase in
review stringency at the margin that is possible when dividing R by the
total number of cases eligible for review under traditional judicial re-
view (N). In contrast, audits can generate valuable increases in prob-
lem detection probabilities by allocating R among a smaller pool of
sampled cases (n* in Figure 3). Perhaps something valuable is gained
from reviewing the full population of cases instead of a sample?
Counterintuitively, sampling theory suggests that-from an informa-
tion-generation perspective-the marginal increase in the accuracy of
information available by reviewing more cases declines dramatically
after a minimum number of cases (several hundred, for example) are
selected for review at random, and this decline occurs even when the
total number of cases in a population is vast.158 Moreover, unless R is
relatively large compared to the previously available resources for re-
view, the value of using the new resources for traditional review from a
158 See infra Part II.B for details. Sampling theory provides one important ratio-
nale for randomization--as opposed to an intuitive but potentially misleading focus
on "problem" cases. Although audits can be adapted to focus on reviewing a subset of
decisions that seem from surface indicators to be especially likely to be problematic,
such an approach dilutes what can be learned about the entire pool of cases. To the
extent the relevant bureaucracies and associated organizational leaders know the ba-
sis for selection, it also makes it easier to evade review. See supra note 101 and accom-
panying text (discussing mixed strategies).
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litigant-focused perspective proves questionable. 
Unless the strin-
gency-problem detection curve turns out to make 
that tiny sliver of
resources available per case critical, there will 
be little change in re-
view practices from a litigant's perspective.
59
FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF NEw RESOURCES ON REVIEW
Problem
Detection
Probability ' I
Stringency of Review
-
Existing Stringency of Review
................ New Stringency of Review if Additional Resources 
(R / N)
Allocated to Traditional Judiciary Review
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But there is still another problem with using 
the resources for
traditional judicial review. Suppose a particular class of 
decisions sub-
ject to review-such as EPA administrative compliance 
orders, or De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) "no-fly" list designations-
featured the precise stringency-problem detection 
curves, making
them highly sensitive to tiny increases in stringency. 
The value of
traditional judicial review as a tool for modern bureaucratic 
perform-
ance would be further limited by the information-distorting 
proper-
ties of litigation. By its nature, litigation produces 
a biased sample.
The cases we learn about are the ones that 
get litigated, and under
various plausible conditions those cases are not 
the only ones likely to
involve valid claims.'
60 As William Simon has pointed out in the 
wel-
159 And suppose the right stringency-problem detection 
curve were present-mak-
ing the new resources critical for each case reviewed. 
Such a scenario would increase
the desirability of litigation, further increasing 
-the costs associated with traditional
review.
160 There may be both overbreadth and under-inclusiveness 
problems. For an
early discussion of selection effects, see George 
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selec-
tion of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
1-6 (1984). For an illuminating
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fare context, for example, this pattern can gradually distort public
perceptions of a policy's strengths and weaknesses by focusing atten-
tion on only one aspect of an administrative system's problems (e.g.,
underpayments, rather than overpayments).i16 In contrast, audits
have the potential to generate information regardless of the willing-
ness or opportunity of individuals to challenge specific decisions.
Although the preceding account abstracts in limited ways from
the real world, it helps demonstrate why audits would be valuable even
in a world already providing some review of discretion. In most cases
where such review is absent or otherwise undermined, the value of
audits would be even greater. The prescriptive case for audits poten-
tially holds in more complex specifications, such as where political
goals are controversial or resources are redistributed from traditional
judicial review and plowed into audits. But the case is especially com-
pelling in the present analysis, because the question involves how to
use new resources, and there is a broad social consensus about what
executive bureaucracies should accomplish.
Evidently, audits introduce their own costs into the equation.
While fixing the precise cost of an audit system depends on the insti-
tutional design issues taken up in Part II, there is good reason to ex-
pect that those costs would be lower than those associated with an
expansion in the availability or stringency of traditional judicial re-
view. If the costs of audits are "scalable," such that we can audit a
smaller proportion of cases if the costs are perceived as being too
high, then the proportion of cases that are audited could be reduced.
Presumably, the costs associated with audits, compared to extending
high-stringency judicial review to all cases in a particular class, would
be less-even if we kept the potential remedy-than reviewing all po-
tential cases. Recall: audits would not necessarily yield a direct rem-
edy. 6 2 To the extent that analyses of the marginal costs and benefits
of review incorporate the possible costs to the executive branch of
discussion of how different institutional rules can shape selection effects, see Peter H.
Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REv, Li-
TIc.. 47, 78-85 (2004).
161 See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 S-r'N. L.
REv. 1431, 1467-68 (1986).
162 If determined advocates of executive branch discretion choose to treat the po-
tential loss of public trust arising from audits as the most important cost to be borne,
then the very fact that audits might be effective in changing public perceptions about
executive discretion might allegedly still make them too costly. This argument may
not always be entirely disingenuous, but it is a harder one to defend than one rooted
in a host of costs involving bureaucratic attention, resources, frivolous claims, and
similarly tangible costs. In any case, the specificity gained in discussing costs may be
at least a partial reward from contemplating audits.
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having a decision vacated by a court, audits would also involve lower
costs because they can be designed merely to reveal information
rather than to provide direct relief.' 63
Although the preceding features are likely to render audits quite
valuable, two caveats are in order at this point. First, the argument
thus far tenders audits as a conceptual alternative to judicial review,
not as a wholesale replacement of it. Its principal contention is that
we should consider the implications of policing discretion through
audits instead of through judicial review, which I have characterized as
a form of supervision premised on applying the same degree of strin-
gency to every case in a given class. This does not imply that audits
should generally replace traditional judicial review as an exclusive
means of overseeing executive discretion. Judicial review obviously
serves a host of important functions, of which producing information
about the performance and reasonableness of public bureaucracies
making discretionary decisions is only one. Litigation harnesses the
intricate machinery of adjudicatory bureaucracy to articulate and clar-
ify legal norms in the context of specific cases. It can vindicate the
interests of people who are legally and morally entitled to a proverbial
"day" in court, or to a set of special remedies for which litigation is the
best rationing device. 164
Second, the belief that audits can deliver the aforementioned
benefits depends on making certain assumptions about the powers of
the auditor, though all are plausible. The auditor must be in a better
position to discover problems in the use of targeted discretion than
the bureaucracy being reviewed. In this context, the reference to
"better position" implies at least three qualities: (1) that the auditor is
163 For a brief discussion of whether the GAO and Inspectors General should allo-
cate a material share of their existing resources to audits of executive discretion, see
infra Part III.A.
164 There may be some instances where actual or perceived resource constraints
force a choice between policing discretion through audits or doing so through some
expanded version of judicial review (i.e., supplementing narrow review of constitu-
tional questions with a broader arbitrariness review). In those exceptional circum-
stances, the framework I have provided suggests that sometimes-such as when it is
likely that officials have made an effort to conceal willful malfeasance-allocating
scarce resources to audits would be preferable to allocating them to traditional judi-
cial review. Nonetheless, my primary goal is therefore to argue that supplementing
such review with audits would make possible the production of socially valuable infor-
mation. Such information simply would not be available where reviewing authorities
are constrained to review every case in a particular class with the same degree of
stringency. Once that information is available, judges could be among the consumers
of it by adjusting their evaluations of the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny that a
given class of decisions warrants.
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motivated to discover problems (and not to exaggerate them), thereby
avoiding some of the willful malfeasance and politically oriented self-
dealing problems that bureaucracies have because of their political
context; (2) that the auditor has sufficient abilities to evaluate the dis-
cretionary decision, perhaps in part through reference to some ex-
plicit or implicit standard of what is expected from such decisions;
and (3) that the auditor is at least somewhat better than the deci-
sionmakers being reviewed at avoiding some of the more subtle mis-
takes that afflict discretionary decisionmaking. Tempting as it may be
to collapse these conditions into an "expertise" parameter, it is impor-
tant to recognize that expertise (in addition to being a far more am-
biguous term than is often recognized) is a dangerously seductive yet
potentially quite dangerous two-edged sword: what makes some bu-
reaucratic decisionmakers blind to the complexities of the problems
they face is precisely their expertise in defining those problems in a
standard, predictable fashion that often turns out to be wrong.1 65
Nonetheless, the auditor(s) must know something about what consti-
tutes accuracy when allegedly terrorist assets are frozen or when agen-
cies use administrative compliance orders.166 Whether it is possible to
generate this and other conditions depends in large measure on how
to resolve questions about the details of the institutional design ad-
dressed below.
4. How Audits Would Fare in a Politically Fragmented World
Most of the time, the world in which bureaucracies exercise dis-
cretion-and therefore the world in which auditors would operate-is
more complicated than the analysis above suggests. Politicians differ
over what they want the bureaucracy to accomplish. 167 Even when leg-
165 See, e.g., VAUGHAN, supra note 136, at 63 ("[T]he consequence of professional
training and experience is itself a particularistic world-view comprising certain as-
sumptions, expectations, and experiences that become integrated with the person's
sense of the world."); see also CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS (1984) ("A warn-
ing ... is only effective if it fits into our mental model of what is going on. As with the
'warnings' of Pearl Harbor, it can get swamped by the multitude of signals that fit our
expectations, and thus be discounted as 'noise' in the system."); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE
LIMITS OF SAFETY (1995) (noting that adding redundant safety devices does not always
increase safety because human operators can often work around these redundancies
if the devices do not serve immediate interests).
166 And obviously, whatever the benefits of specialization, they need to be bal-
anced against the risks.
167 See generally Terry M. Moe, The New Economics of Organization, 28 Am. J. POL. SCI.
739 (1984) (arguing that theories of hierarchy developed in the field of organiza-
tional economics can contribute much to the understanding of political control over
bureaucracies).
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islative majorities support the creation of the bureaucracy or the dele-
gation of legal powers to it, some coalition members may actively work
to restrain the agency's powers. Others will encourage the agency to
make the broadest reading of its mandate. 6 In what follows, I relax
the assumption of broad political consensus about what constitutes
desirable bureaucratic performance. The analysis reveals: (1) that au-
ditors would likely have a much harder time in such a world, but (2)
that participants in the political process could still be persuaded to
support audits in narrow circumstances. Put simply, the analysis here
shows how generating sufficient political interest for audits to survive
is possible even in a politically complicated world of heterogeneous
political preferences and divided politicians. The range of dynamics
making this result unlikely (though far from impossible) is explored
in Parts III and IV. For now the point is that political realities make
the fate of audits contingent, rather than dooming them entirely.
To see this, imagine a somewhat different situation than the one
posited in the previous subsection. First, lawmakers and executive
branch officials in a governing coalition have political preferences re-
garding what they want the bureaucracy to do with its legal authority
(approve drugs faster or more slowly, impose fewer or more environ-
mental administrative compliance orders, make it easier or more diffi-
cult for an alien to demonstrate sufficient credible fear to merit
formal asylum procedures, and so on). 169 And those preferences dif-
fer more often than not. Second, politicians in a governing coalition
may nonetheless also have a set of more widely shared concerns about
bureaucratic performance1 7  Regardless of their preferences about
the existence of nuclear weapons, for example, lawmakers and execu-
tive branch officials are likely to be alarmed by material lapses in the
168 See Weingast, supra note 146, at 318-31.
169 For examples of work analyzing the implications of divergent preferences on
specific issues among members of broad governing coalitions, see David P. Baron, A
Noncooperative Theory of Legislative Coalitions, 33 Am. J. POL. SCI. 1048 (1989); Michael
Laver & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Government Coalitions and Intraparty Politics, 20 BRIT. J.
POL. Sci. 489 (1990). For an analysis of when coalition governments have especially
pronounced incentives to monitor the bureaucratic implementation of policies at the
ministerial level, see Micahel F. Thies, Keeping Tabs on Partners: The Logic of Delegation
in Coalition Governments, 45 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 580 (2001).
170 See Bruce Bimber, Information as a Factor in Congressional Politics, 16 LECIS. STUD.
Q. 585, 596 (1991). Indeed, although the incidence of legislative proposals drawing
unanimous or near-unanimous support varies, such proposals are not rare. For a dis-
cussion of empirical evidence demonstrating the recurring importance of universal or
near-universal legislative coalitions, see Melissa P. Collie, The Legislature and Distribu-
tive Policy Making in Formal Perspective, 13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427, 445-49 (1988).
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safety of a nuclear stockpile. 17' Concern about bureaucratic malfea-
sance may also straddle ideological divisions even when the potential
for catastrophe falls far short of accidental nuclear detonation; both
opponents and proponents of particular surveillance programs, for in-
stance, may share concerns about the program's potential mismanage-
ment even when their underlying reasons for concern are different. 72
Third, audits consume resources. As the analysis above noted, these
resources may be used for alternative purposes. The political merits
of those alternative uses weigh on decisionmakers. Fourth, politicians
may have greater or lesser uncertainty about bureaucratic perform-
ance depending on the context.178
When politicians consider the merits of developing an auditing
system in such a world, the complications come from more than just
the direct cost of that system. While audits may limit near-universally
derided problems (such as, for example, federal agents' use of surveil-
lance authority under the Patriot Act to pursue personal vendettas),
they can also stop agencies from achieving goals that some politicians
would rather see them achieve. 74 Politicians consider this trade-off in
the context of four critical factors that follow from the assumptions
above: (1) the cost of audits relative to other desirable functions, (2)
the perceived risk of broadly derided problems, (3) the extent of un-
certainty about bureaucratic performance with respect to such
problems, and (4) the potential impact of audits on agency activities
that inspire differing degrees of political support. It is manifestly pos-
sible, as lawmakers and executive branch officials weigh these consid-
erations, for them to conclude that audits' potential to reduce
uncertainty and prevent near-universally derided bureaucratic activity
outweigh their costs or their unfavorable political effects. 75
171 For an illuminating account of how common such lapses are, see SAGAN, supra
note 165, at 251.
172 See supra Part I.D.2 for a discussion of the risks of bureaucratic malfeasance
and related shortcomings.
173 SeeJonathan Bendor & Terry M. Moe, An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics,
79 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 755, 761 (1985) (discussing variations in the extent of politi-
cians' knowledge of bureaucratic performance).
174 Audits' chilling effect on agency activities found desirable by a subset of the
political coalition would arise as a result of the information they might reveal to piv-
otal legislators or organized interests, who could in turn shape the perceptions of
mass political audiences.
175 Cf William Bernhard, A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Inde-
pendence, 92 AM. POL. Sci. Riv. 311, 312-15 (1998) (discussing how legislators may
create an independent central bank as a commitment device not only in spite of, but
because of, politicians' differing incentives on monetary policy); Matthew Potoski,
Managing Uncertainty Through Bureaucratic Design: Administrative Procedures and State Air
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Such calculations would be shaped by beliefs about the prospects
for political control of the bureaucracy, which can raise or lower the
value of keeping bureaucratic discretion as unfettered as possible
from their perspective.176 In addition, as noted in Part IV, politicians
who might support audits if voting sincerely may still have strategic
reasons to oppose audits in the hopes of provoking more pronounced
institutional change. But the possibility remains that audits initially
can survive political evisceration, and the intuition in support of that
possibility is a simple one: even in the presence of ideological differ-
ences, raw errors can matter enough to engender support for audits
among politicians and executive branch officials with sharply different
policy goals.' 77 And once audits begin to occur, the auditors them-
selves may endeavor to build a political constituency for them. 78
The strategic dynamic occasionally making audits politically via-
ble can be analogized to committee deference in legislatures, where
majoritarian chamber coalitions defer to legislative committees to en-
courage the development of specialization. The problem legislators
face in that context is uncertainty about the precise effect of the com-
plex laws they enact, such as immigration and refugee law provisions,
complex tax depreciation changes, new rules governing the transfer
of defense-related technologies to other countries, and changes to the
drug approval process. An important strand of scholarship on the or-
ganization of the Congress persuasively argues that politicians can bet-
ter achieve their goals by reducing the extent of that uncertainty, even
when lawmakers have competing or opposite distributional inter-
Pollution Control Agencies, 9 J. PuB. ADMIN. REs. & THEORY 623, 626 (1999) (discussing
the information-generating benefits of specific procedural mechanisms and institu-
tional designs for state legislators with differing political goals); Douglas H.
Shumavon, Policy Impact of the 1974 Congressional Budget Act, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 339,
346-47 (1981) (discussing legislators' incentive for the creation of the Congressional
Budget Office on the basis of the value of unbiased information to politicians with
differing political goals).
176 See Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Pol-
icy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 321, 362-28 (2002) (demonstrating the extent to
which, from legislators' perspective, the desirability of mechanisms to constrain the
executive branch depends on beliefs about future control of the executive branch).
177 The existence of an audit program-run by an external private-sector com-
pany-associated with the Treasury Department's anti-terrorism wire-transfer screen-
ing program involving the SWIFT system may serve as an example. See Greg Miller &
Josh Meyer, Officials Defend Bank Data Tracking, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at Al.
Some politicians opposed to the program would still prefer that, if the program is to
operate, audits be included in its institutional design. See, e.g., id. But see infra Part
IV.A for a discussion of why some opponents of the wire-transfer screening program
might have strategic reasons to oppose audits.
178 See infra Part N.C.
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ests. 179 On the other hand, reducing uncertainty is costly and re-
quires specialization. Politicians solve the problem by organizing the
legislature to encourage specialization, thereby reducing uncertainty
over time and enlarging the scope of benefits legislators can dis-
tribute. As with the opportunity cost associated with specialization,
the creation of and deference to an audit system introduces a layer of
costs. Some costs-such as allocating the resources for the system to
operate-are generic, borne across the legislature itself. Others, such
as the potential impact of audits on the ability of bureaucracies to
make discretionary decisions stretching their legal mandate and pleas-
ing to only a fraction of a governing political coalition, are borne by
specific members (and in this case, those preferring such potentially
distorted implementation). But given the limitations of traditional ju-
dicial review and other monitoring strategies, not having audits proba-
bly increases legislators' uncertainty about the consequences of their
policy choices, raising the same concerns for legislators that the ab-
sence of specialization would.
There is, in effect, a limited political window for audits that opens
when political fears of bureaucratic mistakes and malfeasance com-
bine with politicians' uncertainty about bureaucratic performance. A
politically-oriented justification for audits is possible even in a compli-
cated world of politicians with competing agendas, where those agen-
das may include a desire among some legislators and executive branch
officials to see bureaucracies fail in achieving their stated goals. Since
neither political apathy nor political sabotage are guaranteed to doom
randomized audits, we may turn our attention to the intricacies of au-
dits' potential institutional design.
II. WHY THE INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN PROBLEMS INHERENT IN AUDITS
ARE MANAGEABLE
While a framework for conducting audits is adaptable almost by
definition, the design of that framework depends on the answers to
practical questions. Four questions, in particular, prove central to im-
plementing audits. Rather than seeking to resolve all the intricacies
of an audit system, the discussion that follows instead shows how to
address the four critical institutional design questions and how the
issues raised by those questions can be dealt with in practice.
179 See KREHBIL, supra note 129, at 264-65; see also Thomas W. Gilligan & Keith
Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a Rational Legislature, 34 Am. J. POL.
Sci. 531, 546 (1990) (noting that committees are superfluous if they possess no exper-
tise with which to reduce uncertainty regarding the effects of legislation that they
sponsor).
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A. What Executive Decisions Should be Audited?
The most immediate such question concerns what discretionary
decisions should be prioritized for auditing in a world of scarce re-
sources. As Kenneth C. Davis recognized a generation ago, govern-
ment authorities are flush with power to make highly informal
decisions affecting people, where "the usual quality of justice" may be
quite low.'8 0 But which decisions should be prioritized for audits? It
is plainly obtuse to seek audits of the most trivial discretionary actions
and informal adjudications, or for similarly trifling executive decisions
outside the context of federal administrative law.""' Certain routine
discretionary decisions, showcased in the preceding discussion, tend
to involve the application of legal authority or general policy justifica-
tions to specific facts; their primary effect is on specific individuals
and groups. 182 This type of discretionary power is what allows execu-
tive branch officials to freeze allegedly terrorist assets, place someone
on a government-run "no-fly" list, or levy certain environmental or oc-
cupational safety fines. This could be called "targeted discretion."
Similar decisions involve bureaucracies applying some implicit or ex-
plicit legal standard, often in combination with some sort of policy
basis (e.g., "enemy combatants are dangerous terrorists, many of them
linked to A1-Qaeda") that the executive branch itself has articulated as
a rationale for these decisions.'8 3 Because of their frequency and
their impact on discrete individuals and groups, these "application to
the fact" types of routine discretionary decisions may be most immedi-
ately suitable for audits.
180 DAVIS, supra note 2, at 216.
181 Cf Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex
Ante Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1057, 1069 (2004) ("Taken
to its logical extreme, a decision to turn on the lights or lower an agency's office
building temperature two degrees constitutes 'informal adjudication."').
182 Routine executive discretion involving the targeted application of standards to
individuals or groups bears some resemblance to the concept of "informal adjudica-
tion" long discussed by administrative law scholars. For a brief discussion of the defi-
nitions associated with "informal adjudication" and some of the doctrinal problems
implicit in this category of administrative action, see id. at 1069-75. Obtaining review
of such decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard, or on the basis of some
constitutional theory, is unlikely to provide adequate oversight for these decisions
because of the specter of the review costs problem. But one should nonetheless be-
ware of the term "informal adjudication" as a description of the full scope of discre-
tionary decisions that merit new review mechanisms. Many discretionary decisions
are neither informal in the sense that they are bereft of some alleged procedural
safeguards (for example, review of administrative compliance orders), and in the case
of many others, the term "adjudication" is but a euphemistic concession to an almost
entirely unrealized aspiration.
183 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 12, at 11-12.
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Of course, not all instances of routine discretion have the preced-
ing characteristics. Within the category of routine discretion outside
the realm of what would be protected by the political question doc-
trine, some observers might legitimately distinguish decisions involv-
ing broad policy judgments. Certain discretionary judgments, for
instance, involve questions of how to interpret a statute or the relevant
policy considerations when developing a legal standard, such as a reg-
ulatory rule or the content of an executive order. Although the prin-
ciple associated with audits (trading off breadth in exchange for
greater depth) could also be usefully applied to instances of broad
policy judgments, broadly applicable policy judgments may call for a
different form of supplemental review compared to the routine discre-
tionary decisions that involve applying rules or standards to a particu-
lar set of facts.1 84
No doubt sometimes executive branch officials will argue that the
distinction between broad policy judgments and routine applications
of authority to individuals and groups is illusory, because some policy
judgments are designed precisely to be carried out through the exer-
cise of targeted discretionary decisions. The Social Security Adminis-
tration promulgates standards governing benefit payments, thereby
making a policy judgment about how to use its targeted discretion.
When government freezes alleged terrorist assets, the State and Trea-
sury Departments implement statutory standards from the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 18 5 as interpreted
through policy judgments in the President's executive orders. They
may further contend that the details of a policy judgment-like pre-
cisely what behaviors make a charity liable to have its assets frozen-
184 Moreover, such judgments are more likely to garner media and legislative at-
tention even in the absence of audits. And existing investigations performed by audit
bureaucracies and congressional committees are more likely to analyze broad policy
judgments rather than routine instances of executive discretion applying standards to
individuals or groups. See infra Part III. Hence, when resource constraints force a
choice between using audits to screen instances of routine discretion involving appli-
cations of law to the facts and broader policy judgments, the former probably merits
greater attention. More generally, the arguments for deferring to the executive
branch when an agency writes a rule or a president signs an executive order seem
weaker when the executive branch claims to be applying a given standard to the facts.
In the latter case the implicit claim is: "we may have to apply some judgment, but
when we detain someone as an enemy combatant, freeze assets, or inspect an indus-
trial plant, there's no question about the purpose we are serving. We're enforcing the
law."
185 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
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should not be made entirely public, 186 or that standards reflecting
policy judgments-should develop organically in response to experi-
ence instead of being fixed ahead of time, or that any review system at
all would wreak havoc. 187
Even if one finds these positions attractive on the surface, it re-
mains useful to draw some distinction between the following classes of
decisions: decisions that explicitly disavow consistency with any stan-
dard, decisions that fix a standard that is supposed to apply across
cases, and decisions that apply standards (or even quite general val-
ues) to specific cases. To the extent that executive authorities claim to
be applying discretion in accordance with a particular policy rationale
or standard (even one that is not derived directly from a statute), ar-
guments against review become exceedingly difficult to accept. Audits
would generate information about whether the publicly asserted stan-
dard was reflected in the discretionary decisions. Though some may
insist that certain discretionary decisions involving national security
(for example) are entirely immune from any standard, 188 in most
cases such a claim seems hard to reconcile with a simple but persistent
imperative: that government decisions should not be arbitrary. In-
deed, audits of executive discretion may prove viable even when the
decisions in question superficially appear less amenable to sampling.
It may be possible to modify audits to shed light on applications of
discretion drawn from a sparse set of decisions, or on policy discretion
exercised in the course of rulemaking, by aggregating cases from dif-
ferent domains into a larger population from which to sample. 18 9
186 See Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985). For a
skeptical view of such contentions, see VAUGnAN, supra note 136, at 389-90.
187 Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (explaining that
although the Court could not review decisions of the executive branch that involved
political discretion, it could enforce the rights of individuals who had been harmed by
executive actions that did not involve political discretion).
188 The contention may be that, in addition to being free of any sort of formal
review, certain national security decisions-like a presidential choice to bomb a po-
tentially threatening target in the Sudan-should not conform to any standard at all.
This position seems to confound the question of whether we should avoid setting a
standard because it is too difficult to monitor, or whether in an ideal world the presi-
dent should never rely on a standard at all. The former is easier to justify than the
latter.
189 Small samples are not a fatal problem when Bayesian techniques are applied
and the analysis is accompanied by appropriate assumptions. See, e.g., M. Elisabeth
Pat6-Cornell, Organizational Aspects of Engineering System Safety: The Case of Offshore Plat-
forms, 250 SCIENCE 1210, 1212 (1990). Regarding policy discretion: although policy
discretion arguably raises different problems, it may also be worth scrutinizing, case-
by-case, the basis for application of an overtly stated policy; for example, how specific
permissible exposure limits get set when courts allow rules that fix multiple-which
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Because of scarce resources, the exclusion of 
broad policy judg-
ments from attention would still force auditors 
to make additional
trade-offs in choosing where to focus their attention. 
In doing so, au-
ditors could draw on at least four factors reflecting 
defensible intu-
itions about the underlying goals of the audit 
system: (1) the extent
(or absence) of alternative review mechanisms, or factors 
favoring in-
terest group or legislative reactions likely to reduce 
the probability of
bureaucratic failure; (2) the costs of discretionary decisions 
(particu-
larly erroneous ones) to individuals or groups aggrieved; 
(3) the exis-
tence of a standard against which decisions 
could be assessed, or the
relative feasibility of constructing such a standard 
from sources such
as public executive branch declarations about 
the particular objectives
of discretionary action in a given context (more on this 
below); and
(4) the potential availability of information that an auditing 
authority
could use to evaluate decisions. Such a framework 
avoids placing traf-
fic stops at national parks at the same level of 
priority as enemy com-
batant designations or social security claims. 
It also avoids facile
reliance on pre-existing, and potentially problematic, 
notions of
where the greatest problems lie in the exercise 
of executive discretion.
B. What Sample Should Be Used?
Regardless of what discretionary decisions are 
audited, the ques-
tion of how large a sample to use depends, as a 
prescriptive matter, on
the costs and benefits of larger (as opposed to smaller) 
samples. As a
practical matter, the auditor's approach to sampling 
might also be in-
formed by political circumstances that translate 
into resource con-
straints (akin to the aforementioned "maximum acceptable 
cost" of
review), and by prior beliefs about the desired deterrent 
effect on
decisionmakers. Ordinary statistical theory 
offers a straightforward
framework to calculate the appropriate sample 
given certain desired
parameters reflecting the decisionmaker's desired 
level of confidence
in the results.190 Although this formulaic analytical 
approach does
not capture all the nuances with which an auditor 
must contend, it
does reveal some important considerations. For 
one, there is no text-
book answer to the question of how large a sample 
should be. Deci-
sionmakers do not (and ought not to) choose desired 
levels of
confidence in a vacuum. As is true of courts and 
legislators structur-
they now discourage, though audits might be 
a promising alternative to simply ban-
ning such rules-instances of information dissemination 
and use of regulatory agen-
cies (as an alternative to the potentially cumbersome 
data quality act rules).
190 See SAMPLE SIzE CALCULATION IN CLINICAL REsEARCH 
28-29 (Shein-Chung
Chow et al. eds., 2003).
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ing the analogous judicial domain, decisionmakers have reason to
consider the costs as well as the benefits-which means that smaller
samples may sometimes be appropriate even if larger ones are more
representative. Since resource constraints can force a trade-off be-
tween stringency of review (for any given case in the sample) and
breadth of review, decisions about sample size should depend, in large
measure, on prior guesses about the slope and shape of the curve de-
picting the impact of stringency on the probability of discovering
problems in decisions.
Those choices regarding sample size should also reflect the fact
that sample size has diminishing marginal returns. Counterintuitively,
as the size of the total population of decisions increases beyond a cer-
tain point, then the proportion of that population that must be re-
viewed to gain a reasonably accurate picture of the whole population
actually declines. Sample sizes of between 500 and 1000 observations
may provide a revealing statistical snapshot even when drawn from
exceedingly large populations. 19 1 This suggests that auditing only a
tiny fraction of a large population and reviewing the sample carefully
might yield valuable new information. Smaller populations (for ex-
ample, all the cases of the 500 or so individuals currently held in
Guantanamo) pose more of a challenge, since even a sample that con-
stitutes a higher total percentage of the population can prove less use-
ful in making statistical inferences if the sample is numerically small in
absolute terms.19 2
Now juxtapose the insights of statistical and organization theory,
and several implications emerge. If the total population of cases is
large enough to allow the auditor to choose between 500 and 1000
cases without exceeding the maximum acceptable cost, then the re-
suiting analysis will likely exhibit desirable properties of reliability
even if the sample is a tiny proportion of the total population of cases
191 For example, if a sample of 1000 cases is drawn randomly from an infinitely
large population where one-half of the population hold a characteristic, the re-
searcher has a 95% chance (or better) of obtaining a result that is plus or minus 3.1
percentage points of the actual distribution in a population. If a sample of 5000 is
drawn under the same conditions, the 95% confidence interval would be plus or mi-
nus 1.4 percentage points. And if a sample of 10,000 is drawn, the 95% confidence
interval would be plus or minus 1 percentage point. See ALAN D. MONROE, ESSENTIALS
OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 69 (2000). While increasing the sample size has diminishing
marginal returns in large populations, things are more complicated with smaller sam-
pie sizes. See CAROLE SUTrON & MA-rruiEW DAVID, SOCIAL RESEARCH 154 (2004).
192 An exhaustive analysis of twenty-five cases of Guantanamo detainees, for exam-
ple, constitutes about 5% of the total population. But in orthodox statistical terms it
yields far less reliable information than a sample of 1% of the total population of
100,000. Cf MONROE, supra note 191, at 69.
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(for example, the total number of indictments issued over 
several
years, or the total number of disability determinations) .193 If 
the cost
of obtaining a sample of that size is allegedly prohibitive, 
or if the total
population is too small to audit hundreds of cases, 
then the auditing
process is best understood not as a means of 
obtaining a statistically
reliable picture of conditions in the population, 
but as a kind of pilot
study informing decisions about the merits of 
existing review proce-
dures. And even small samples subject to audits can expand 
knowl-
edge considerably. 194 Finally, regardless of the 
size of the population,
the proportion of cases audited can be adjusted to achieve the 
related
but distinct goal of deterring malfeasance by 
placing decisionmakers
on notice that some proportion of their choices 
will be scrutinized.
Sample size also depends on whether audits are 
meant to address
both over- and under-enforcement. Audits could, 
for example, in-
clude both instances where targeted discretion 
resulted in some sanc-
tion or cost being imposed (creating the potential for so-called 
Type I
errors), as well as those instances where it was not imposed 
(Type II
errors). For example, should someone audit just those cases 
where a
charity was designated as a global terrorist organization, 
or also those
where sanctions were not imposed? It is quite 
likely that we would
learn a good deal from including the cases 
where powers were not
used. But this would raise two problems that demand 
attention. The
first problem is deciding whether the expanded 
population of cases
should include the whole universe (i.e., every charity, or 
perhaps every
charity operating in the Middle East) or just "near misses" 
(charities
that attracted the attention of State, Treasury, 
the CIA, or the Na-
tional Security Council but, perhaps because 
of political considera-
tions, were not specially designated). The former is more 
accurate
193 Even in such situations, the concept 
of statistical confidence ought to be
treated as a species of metaphor, and applied 
with some nuance, since the auditor's
role here is not to estimate a precise quantitative 
parameter but to conduct a rea-
soned analysis of the decision in accordance 
with a defensible standard. For an inter-
esting effort to address the problem of tailoring 
qualitative concepts of reliability in
the analogous context of property value appraisals, 
see Nathan Berg, A Simple Bayesian
Procedure for Sample Size Determination in an Audit of Property 
Value Appraisals, REAL. EST.
ECON., Spring 2006, at 133.
194 Cf SUTTON & DAVID, supra note 191, at 154 (noting 
that even a sample as small
as thirty can yield useful statistical information). Moreover, 
it may be possible to deal
with domains involving extremely low numerosity 
by creating a reliable system to ran-
domize the probability that a decision will be reviewed 
at all (or, to put it differently,
by lumping together several classes of related, 
low-numerosity decisions and then au-
diting some proportion of them). Cf March et al., supra 
note 99, at 2 (noting that
sometimes "[o] rganizations attempt such pooling" of 
cases to create a larger sample
from which to assess performance).
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but would so quickly consume auditing resources that it may prove
unworkable, at least initially. In response, auditors could design pilot
studies, some of which could be targeted to domains where under-
enforcement appears likely to be a more pronounced problem. The
latter is simpler but less accurate. The second problem is overcoming
the likely political resistance (from the executive branch, who would
already have reason to resist audits) that would arise if auditors further
expanded their mandate to include discretionary decisions not to act.
Part IV returns to the question of how auditors could mitigate more
general problems of political resistance over time, and explains how
such resistance could have the laudatory effect of giving auditors rea-
son to cultivate reputations for impartiality.
C. Which Organization Should Audit and What Standard
Should It Apply?
The prospect of overcoming political resistance to audits depends
in part on what institutional actor shoulders the burden of auditing.
Despite the existence of cases involving sample audits, some observers
may question whether ordinary courts would have the inclination, le-
gal authority, institutional culture, or expertise necessary to engage
directly in audits. 195 The prospect of court involvement in auditing
may be simplified if judges appoint masters to undertake some of this
work and they could fashion doctrines conditioning deference on the
existence of reliable auditing done by someone else, or providing for
audits as a remedy in the (unlikely) case where litigation itself reveals
bureaucratic failures. 196 By rewarding bureaucracies with reliable au-
dit structures, courts could advance two interrelated objectives. They
could contribute to mechanisms likely to enhance the overall quality
of discretionary decisions (relative to some defensible, socially rele-
vant standard of quality encompassing, for example, reductions in the
probability of obvious mistakes), and they would be creating the con-
ditions for enriching the information on the basis of which a court
can resolve specific cases. To the extent that courts are viewed as una-
195 For a somewhat stylized argument that the Supreme Court (or, more generally,
appellate courts) already engage in something akin to audits, see Matt Spitzer & Eric
Talley, Judicial Auditing, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 649 (2000). It should be noted, however,
that Spitzer and Talley are using the concept of auditing differently in that context, to
describe a court's decision to review a particular case at a high level of stringency
rather than a decision to select a subset of executive branch discretionary decisions at
random for more stringent review. See id. at 652.
196 They would have to do this in a way that avoids running afoul of the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
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ble to require audits given constraints in their ability to impose proce-
dures not explicitly grounded in statutes,
197 legislators could create an
Article I court with a distinctive mission and resources to 
build special-
ized capacity-or an entirely separate bureaucracy. 
Among existing
agencies, the GAO and IG Offices are best positioned 
to do this sort of
work (though, as I note below, they have largely avoided doing so). 
In
short, while audits could be performed by existing 
federal audit bu-
reaucracies, a combination of judicial and legislative innovation could
lower barriers preventing Article III courts from more 
easily encourag-
ing audits. At the same time, direct participation 
by courts is not es-
sential to the success of an audit scheme,
1 98 the results of which would
permit courts to vary stringency of review for different 
classes of deci-
sions even if judges are uninvolved in conducting the audits
themselves.
Dispensing with courts as auditors raises the question 
of whether
any government agency is necessary at all. References 
to random se-
lection and evaluation standards set in advance 
admittedly turn the
argument for audits into what resembles a plea for more 
research,
with the nature of the researcher mattering less than 
the contents and
methods of the analysis. But the situation is not quite 
so simple, and
as a prescriptive matter, cuts in favor of audits by 
a public agency.
Government bureaucracies have powers and responsibilities 
that re-
searchers rarely do. Independent regulatory agencies 
showcase how
public agencies can be transparently engineered 
for balance.1 99
Agencies may be able to solve collective action problems 
by deploying
subpoena powers, and more readily generating media 
attention. The
arguments for government conducted audits therefore 
echo some of
197 Id. at 557-58.
198 Audits would not deprive courts of alternative 
means of adjusting stringency of
review even within a particular class of cases. Spitzer 
and Talley, for example, discuss
how reviewing courts could combine their beliefs 
about a lower court and observable
characteristics of a lower court's decision to determine 
whether to review that deci-
sion (or to review it more stringently). Spitzer & Talley, supra 
note 195, at 667 (indi-
cating how appellate courts, functioning as "auditors" of lower courts, 
might adopt
"an auditing strategy that can be either even-handed or asymmetric, depending 
on
whether the dominant reason for reviewing is 
(respectively) imprecision or ideol-
ogy"). The authors recognize, however, that such an approach 
represents a departure
from the principle that like cases should be treated 
alike by courts, and acknowledge
that external observers expect courts to adhere to 
that principle. See id. at 675 ("One
of the basic principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that 
like cases should be
treated alike.").
199 SeeJohn F. Duffy, The Death of the Independent 
Regulatory Commission (and
the Birth of a New Independence?), 54-57 (June 9, 2006) 
(on file with author).
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those for government regulation of food and drugs, for example, in-
stead of self-regulation.200
Whatever the precise organizational structure, the auditor must
be invested with the power to compel production of evidence and tes-
timony. In the absence of such power, it would be hard for the audi-
tor to delve into enemy combatant designations or container
inspections more aggressively than a court could. Sensitive informa-
tion could be reviewed in camera, an approach that would further
weaken the argument that review should be precluded because the
information involved is too sensitive. 201 Because this problem has
been so often managed in other contexts, I suspect any objection to
audits relying on it is a red herring. Recent history is full of examples
where this problem has been solved.20 2 In addition to courts review-
ing the information in camera, high profile commissions like the 9/11
Commission and expert working groups routinely get security clear-
ances and access to classified information. 203 The resulting, publicly
disclosed work product either omits classified information or provides
some redacted summary version of it.
Regardless of whether the case involves sensitive information or
not, what standard would the auditor use to evaluate it? Ideally the
statutes or constitutional provisions implicated in the discretionary de-
cisions would provide some standard for the auditor to use, even when
the standard is too vague for courts to apply. Or the auditing author-
ity can analyze whether a number of statutes and constitutional doc-
trines together could be taken to imply conditions on the use of
200 Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 45 ("In some circumstances, (government] in-
terference may produce significant benefits for trivial costs .... [R]egulatory pro-
grams are necessary to solve collective action and coordination problems.").
201 Under existing law, judges sometimes handle sensitive information and use it
to make decisions in cases. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715-16 (1974).
It is hard to see why audits of targeted discretion should be avoided on the grounds
that the underlying discretionary decision depends on sensitive information. If the
argument is that it is dangerous or problematic to share the results of audits of
targeted discretion because the policy domain requires complete secrecy even of the
quality of decisions being made, then that argument should be advanced on its own
merits and it should have to overcome a high barrier. See, e.g., Ex pane Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 24-25 (1942). Even in the prosecution of alleged Al Qaeda terrorist Zacharias
Moussaoui, the federal government provided Moussaoui's defense team with the op-
portunity to review classified information in the context of the criminal discovery pro-
cess. See A. John Radsan, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess From Minnesota, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1417, 1433 (2005).
202 See, e.g., Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
203 See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ArACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMIS.
SION REPORT (2004).
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discretionary powers. 20 4 The auditor could even use 
statements from
the executive branch itself to see whether the audited 
cases seem to be
consistent with those statements.
20 5 In some circumstances, where the
executive refuses to articulate an explicit standard 
to fill in gaps left by
executive, legislative, or judicial silence, the auditor itself could 
articu-
late a reasonable standard (which is, by the way, what the 
GAO and IG
do in related contexts, when they audit "broad 
management prac-
tices"). The standard might reflect insights drawn from constitutional
interpretation, policy considerations, or even 
statutes' legislative
history.
D. What Should Depend on the Outcome of an Audit?
A final issue concerns the consequence of audit 
results. As an
initial thought experiment, imagine that the 
auditor labors under a
default presumption that the results of its investigation 
will simply be
announced to the public. A striking feature of audits may ultimately
prove their capacity to enhance how executive 
authority is policed
without directly delivering relief. What this 
would accomplish de-
204 Deriving such implicit standards is exactly 
what the Supreme Court has dis-
couraged in cases such as Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821 (1985), There the Court
held that agency decisions not to use their enforcement 
powers are almost always
"committed to agency discretion" under the terms of the Administrative 
Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (2) (2000). Chaney, 470 U.S. at 837-38. 
The exception is where
a statute provides "clear guidelines" that a court 
could use as a standard against which
to judge agency decisions. Indeed, when no such standard is 
apparent on the face of
the statute, then courts tend to find that the absence 
of such a standard overcomes
what is otherwise a presumption of reviewability. 
See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182,
192-94 (1993). What these cases sometimes gloss over 
(but seem to recognize far
more explicitly in cases involving the non-delegation 
doctrine) is the extent to which
the existence of standards is on a continuum, 
where virtually any government action
or inaction (including decisions not to prosecute) could 
be evaluated in accordance
with some defensible criterion. For an exception, 
see Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d
1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding an exception where 
an agency has "consciously
and expressly adopted a general policy" that is so 
extreme as to amount to an abdica-
tion of its statutory responsibility). This is not to suggest 
that courts should be the
primary actors in conducting targeted discretion 
audits (perhaps some independent
auditing authority including a mixture of judges and non-judges 
would have more
flexibility to articulate standards). It is, rather, to point out 
that courts' reluctance to
articulate standards when they find them missing 
on the face of a statute should not
be taken as an indication that such an enterprise 
is fruitless.
205 For example, if statutes say that the CIA Director 
can fire someone for being a
national security risk and let him define what that 
means, then the audit could review
the definition with particular care to see if it is plausible and 
announce the results, or it
could rely on agency definitions of "national security" 
in related contexts. Cf Chaney,
470 U.S. at 836 (suggesting that an agency decision not 
to enforce could be chal-
lenged if the agency itself has committed to 
act in specified circumstances).
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pends on the reactions of legislators and the mass 
public, which can
vary depending on the circumstances.
20 6 Not everyone among the
public would care enough about how laws are applied 
on their behalf
to respond with indignation to audit results revealing 
arbitrariness in
the process to determine who is allegedly raising money 
for terrorists
or engaging in environmental violations. Nonetheless, 
as Part III
notes, reports from existing audit bureaucracies 
turn out to already
have generated dozens of stories in national newspapers 
and televi-
sion networks. 20 7 Thus, public disclosure may have 
the potential to
impact crucial features of the political game as the 
executive branch
seeks to demonstrate its competence.
On the other hand, mere public discourse may 
accomplish little
where the media, organized interests, and the mass 
public have other
concerns. Recall that audits' touchstone is their 
flexibility. The audi-
tor might be empowered to impose belated sanctions 
whenever audits
reveal problematic cases. A woman improperly barred 
from entering
the country could be allowed to return. Assets 
that should not have
been frozen could be unblocked. Enemy combatants 
could be set
free. This is certainly a principled position, though 
it obviously raises
certain costs associated with the audits, and could 
ultimately affect
their political feasibility.
20 A third approach is for the results of au-
dits to trigger additional procedural standards, such 
as review of more
decisions through stratified sampling targeting areas 
where problems
have been newly discovered. Perhaps more important, 
auditors and
courts may gradually come to view themselves in 
a symbiotic relation-
ship, as courts adjust their calculus of deference to executive action 
in
response to audit results or the existence of audit 
programs for partic-
ular sectors of activity, and auditors adjust the standards they use 
to
audit cases in response to judicial, elaborations of statutes or constitu-
tional doctrines.
In any event, the choice among these alternatives 
is not one that
can be taken in a vacuum. It is likely to depend heavily 
on the politi-
206 See Asher Arian & Sigalit Olzaeker, Political 
and Economic Interactions with Na-
tional Security Opinion: The Gulf War Period in Israel, 43 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 58, 65-71
(1999); David 0. Sears et al., Political System Support and 
Public Response to the Energy
Crisis, 22 Am. J. POL. Sci. 56, 66-75 (1978).
207 See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
208 Although I do not develop the argument 
here, one might imagine a situation
where the designers of the audit system would 
trade-off the ability to grant relief in
exchange for the political and economic 
resources to audit more cases or to do so
more intensely. Truth commissions, for example, 
reflect an equilibrium where sup-
porters have likely traded off explicit punitive 
power in exchange for political and
economic resources.
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cal considerations discussed in Part IV. The key is to 
evaluate the
problem of remedies not only in terms of what benefits 
could be pro-
vided to aggrieved individuals, but also (more generally) how differ-
ent remedial schemes are likely to impact agencies' 
willingness to
learn from their mistakes and structure their work 
to avoid future
abuses. In short, through careful institutional engineering, 
analogies
to existing institutions, and some experimentation, 
most of the
"problems" identified can be solved. We might then ask whether such
problems have. been solved already.
III. WHY REFORMS CONTRAST WITH THE STATUS 
Quo
The analysis began by focusing primarily on court review 
of exec-
utive discretion. In reality, though courts have distinctive 
legal powers
and responsibilities, they are but one component 
of a larger web of
institutions potentially capable of overseeing executive 
discretion.
Formal judicial review is but one means through which executive
power may be restrained-and even this depends 
to a considerable
extent on its interaction with the views of government 
officials, organ-
ized interests, and the public regarding the value 
of compliance with
judicial decisions.20 9 Other factors include some combination 
of the
press, audit bureaucracies such as the GAO and Inspectors 
General,
legislators, and even organized interests and social 
movements draw-
ing support from among the mass public.
While these factors are unquestionably relevant, two 
observations
are worth making about their impact on executive 
discretion. First, in
many cases, legislators, organized interests, the media, 
and the mass
public become a viable means of disciplining executive 
discretion in
response to the information generated through formal 
review mecha-
nisms, such as the judiciary's role in overseeing executive 
activities.210
Because of judicial review's importance, limitations on judicial 
review
may distort the picture of executive discretion 
that emerges-and
therefore the relevance of the aforementioned 
factors. Politicians
and the media sometimes have reason to generate 
that information
through investigations that may turn up some potentially 
useful tidbit
209 See generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN 
LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY (2002)
(noting that important legal decisions in various contexts, but 
particularly those im-
plicating race relations, did not produce corresponding 
social conformity therewith);
Barry Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule 
of Law, 91 AM. POL.
SC. REV. 245 (1997) (employing game theory to find that 
democratic stability de-
pends on self-enforcing equilibrium).
210 SeeJAMES HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT'S FIT 
TO SELL 15-17 (2004) (discuss-
ing the economics of the media and their incentives 
against resource-intensive forms
of news generation).
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of executive malfeasance (from their perspective). There is no com-
pelling reason to think that these erstwhile investigators will routinely
face sufficient incentives to investigate, which is why observers assign
such relative importance to judicial review as a means of generating
information with the potential to provoke political and journalistic re-
sponses. 2 11 Even the otherwise laudable Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) 2 1 2 is no reliable bulwark against bureaucratic misconduct.
Such misconduct may afflict responses to FOIA requests in ways that
are difficult for courts to monitor, and the law itself is riddled with
exceptions.2 1 3
Second, whether audit bureaucracies or legislators engage in au-
dits or something similar is an empirical question. Accordingly, this
Part examines the behavior of two sets of actors capable of producing
the sort of accountability-enhancing information that intrusive judi-
cial review can. The GAO and the IG offices, which might be termed
"audit bureaucracies," possess a broad mandate to audit federal gov-
ernment activities and produce information about how laws are imple-
mented. Although they operate in a complex political environment
shaped by the legislature and the executive branch, they are not sub-
ject to the constraints that ostensibly lead courts to fashion stringency
standards applying across the board to all potential cases in a particu-
lar class. Similarly, the legislature itself can use its investigative powers
directly to generate information about how executive discretion is
exercised.
In fact, the value of supplementing judicial review with a new pro-
gram for auditing executive discretion depends largely on whether or
not such audits are already commonplace. Perhaps audits of execu-
tive discretion involving random samples of discrete applications of
legal authority to specific individuals or groups are regular features of
the work already carried out by the GAO and Inspectors General of-
fices. These audit bureaucracies were, after all, created to audit the
government, and their jurisdiction has expanded to include investigat-
ing the management of government programs. Their activities are
sometimes directed by legislators, who (in turn) can proceed with
their own audits. Do they?
211 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 209, at 280-90 (discussing the role of civil rights court
cases in generating information that can galvanize political and journalistic responses
to public officials' decisions).
212 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-557 (2000).
213 See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of In-
formation Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195 (2004); Amy E. Rees, Note, Recent Developments
Regarding the Freedom of Information Act: A "Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps
Both,"44 Duoe L.J. 1183 (1995).
2006]
292 AEAWRVE vL.81
A. Audit Bureaucracies Do Not Ordinarily Perform Audits
For the audit bureaucracies the answer is generally "no." 
These
agencies undertake a tremendous amount of work 
on bureaucratic
performance, which can be considered valuable either 
from a social
welfare perspective or from a narrower, Congress-focused 
view empha-
sizing the interests of the lawmakers that created 
and exert recurring
influence over the audit bureaucracies. The scope 
of their authority is
quite broad. The GAO, for example, has the power 
to examine "all
matters" relating in some way to the disbursement 
of public money. 21
4
The Inspectors General offices in federal departments 
have similarly
broad mandates. 215 Yet they appear to rarely perform 
audits of execu-
tive discretion involving random (or stratified) sampling of 
legally
consequential discretionary decisions, assessed 
against a defensible
standard (either a pre-existing one or articulated by the auditors).
The trajectory of the audit bureaucracies has spawned a small
literature on their historical origin, legal jurisdiction, organization,
and culture. 216 But relatively little is known about 
what the reports of
these audit bureaucracies are about, what methods 
they use to de-
velop their analyses, whether these reports contain 
recommendations
that agencies actually implement, and whether any 
of this gets media
attention. These questions are relevant to the present 
project because
they affect whether there is a deficit of the kinds 
of audits I recom-
mend, and their answers help us learn something 
about how audit
bureaucracies could enhance their supervision 
of executive
discretion.
Some preliminary answers emerge from a recent 
pilot study of
the audit bureaucracies, analyzing a sample of 400 
Inspectors General
and GAO reports issued during the last five years.
217 The reports in
the sample pertain to five major government agencies with a broad
spectrum of regulatory and administrative responsibilities.
2 18 The
analysis sought to ascertain the proportion of reports 
auditing execu-
214 31 U.S.C. § 712(1) (2000).
215 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
216 See, e.g., LIGHT, supra note 117; ROGER R. TRASK, 
DEFENDER OF THE PUBLIC IN-
TEREST: THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
1921-1966 (1996).
217 See Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, GAO and IG 
Report Pilot Study: A Preliminary
Analysis of the Methodologies Used by the GAO 
and Inspectors General to "Audit"
Federal Agencies (Apr. 1, 2006) (on file with author).
218 The analysis employs a stratified sampling design 
focusing on these agencies
because some of the goals of the larger empirical 
project depend on closely studying
the interactions between the audit bureaucracies and 
a small number of specific agen-
cies with differing functions. Id. At 1-2.
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tive discretion, which has been defined as involving: (1) the selection
of a random sample (2) of executive branch legal determinations af-
fecting individuals or groups and (3) identifying or defining a stan-
dard against which to assess such decisions. 21 9
Fewer than one in five reports in the sample appear to use any
process of random selection of cases from a larger population, and
the vast majority of these focused on the traditional financial account-
ing functions that convey almost no information about how an agency
uses its legal discretion to affect directly the fortunes of individuals or
groups. 220 Meanwhile, less than two percent of the reports in the sam-
ple involved audits of executive discretion. 221 And even among these
219 Id. at 1.
220 For a rare example of an Inspector General report that comes close to achiev-
ing the goal of systematically analyzing executive discretion, see OFFICE OF THE INSPEC-
TOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES'
ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW
YoRK (2003). Although this report focuses primarily on describing the treatment of
immigration detainees at two government facilities, it did undertake a thorough re-
view of the files describing the status and treatment of the 762 aliens held in connec-
tion with the September 11 investigation. Id. at 1. While the report does not leverage
the insight that fewer cases reviewed more thoroughly can sometimes yield greater
information, its searing analysis proves so informative in part (in all likelihood) be-
cause the investigators conceived of their task in terms of generating information,
rather than in terms of resolving particular cases. Id. at 5-7. The vast majority of
other reports surveyed involve either the use of interviews and non-random analysis of
documents to make broad policy recommendations, or traditional financial audits.
Of course, in some sense the GAO and Inspector General reports that monitor any
aspect of government performance are examining the application of executive discre-
tion because they are examining how agencies perform in some (ordinarily quite gen-
eral) aspect of a mission they are lawfully empowered to undertake. While all of these
studies expand the scope of information (and in some cases generate considerable
media attention), there is a striking gap in the methodology and subject matter cover-
age of these reports substantially overlapping with the audits of executive discretion
recommended here. Specifically, what the reports almost never encompass are sys-
tematic audits of repetitive, discrete applications of executive power affecting individ-
uals or groups using sampling.
221 Cu~llar, supra note 217, at 21. Four trained research assistants coded the GAO
and IG reports. The stratified random sample was drawn from among reports com-
pleted between March 1999 and March 2005, and focused on the following five de-
partments (or their components): the Department of Homeland Security, the
Department ofJustice, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Labor Department,
and the Department of Defense. Id. at 2. Of the sample of 400 reports analyzed,
about sixty-eight (or seventeen percent) used some form of random sampling. Id. at
21. The bulk of these did so in the context of a traditional financial audit. Only seven
reports in the total sample undertook audits of executive discretion. Id. These cov-
ered matters such as the proportion of background checks conducted by the Trans-
portation Security Agency on prospective airport screeners that met statutory
2wo6]
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reports, the predominant concern was with federal grants and con-
tracting decisions. Investigative and enforcement activities were not
addressed in the small proportion of reports auditing executive discre-
tion. Some reports occasionally chronicle problems in administrative
systems like those governing aviation security. Nonetheless, audits of
executive discretion are essentially missing from the picture of the au-
dit bureaucracies' work. For instance, the GAO's otherwise thorough
report on the Transportation Security Agency's computerized aviation
security system shows how carefully the agency reviewed the architec-
ture of the computer algorithm and the management practices associ-
ated with the systems. 22 2 It did not, however, pick a subset of names to
inquire exhaustively how they ended up on the list or what evidence
supported that determination. 2 3 Determining the proportion of the
audit bureaucracies' current resources that should focus on auditing
executive discretion is not the focus of this project. Instead the point
is to highlight the shortcomings of traditional judicial review, to sug-
gest that audits of executive discretion-were they to occur more reg-
ularly-could substantially address the resulting gaps, and to
emphasize that the costs (measured in a number of ways) associated
with such audits should be lower than the costs of meaningfully ex-
panding traditional judicial review. Whatever the value of what the
audit bureaucracies do, their tendency to focus attention on tradi-
tional financial auditing and thematic management analyses has lim-
ited their capacity to resolve problems associated with the current
scope of executive discretion.2 24
standards and the extent of FEMA payouts for certain disaster relief programs. A
separate comparison sample of fifty reports randomly selected from among those
dealing with departments not in the stratified sample (covering similar dates) yielded
similar results. Id.
222 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-385, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COM-
MITTEES, AVIATION SECURITY 14-17 (2004).
223 Id. For a study of Inspectors General revealing that only about ten percent of
their audits sought to measure program results as opposed to financial, procurement,
or management performance, see Kathryn E. Newcomer, Opportunities and Incentives
far Improving Program Quality: Auditing and Evaluation, 54 PUB. ADM1N. REV. 147, 152
(1994).
224 Moreover, the audit bureaucracies have incentives to distort their portfolio of
activities towards a focus on procurement, contracting, grants, and financial audits
and away from auditing executive discretion (particularly in the absence of congres-
sional pressure to do the latter), relative to what is likely to be most socially desirable.
The former activities are more likely to produce unambiguous financial results that
can more easily support arguments for preserving and expanding agency resources.
The latter may exacerbate the political animosity between the audit bureaucracies
and ordinary executive agencies. See infra Part 1V. Accordingly, changing the existing
distribution of activity among the audit bureaucracies to favor audits of executive dis-
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The possibility that audit bureaucracies could be 
encouraged to
perform more audits of executive discretion without 
entirely neglect-
ing other issues may provoke two skeptical reactions 
worth discussing.
First, there is the matter of whether audits of executive 
discretion
would be salient to the public. In fact, GAO and IG 
office reports get
a considerable amount of attention in the print 
and television media.
An analysis of the number of stories in the New York 
Times and in tran-
scripts of television news stories between January 
2002 and January
2005 mentioning the GAO or IG offices reveals that 
the audit bureau-
cracies receive considerable media attention.
22 5 Nearly 1000 articles
during this period appearing in the New York Times 
mention the GAO
or IG offices. 226 A random sample of 200 of 
those news stories indi-
cates that, while only about three percent of 
the stories involving the
GAO appear on page one, about ten percent of 
those mentioning the
IG offices do so. Audit bureaucracies are also 
discussed on broadcast
news and cable channels. Even in these media 
(and during the same
time period), nearly 500 news segments mention the 
various IG of-
fices, and about thirty mention the GAO.
227 These figures exceed the
number of mentions garnered by many federal 
cabinet agencies. 22 8
Second, the question arises whether an agency 
would merely ig-
nore the prescriptive implications of an audit 
revealing unfavorable
performance. If it did, then the promised learning 
bonus from audits
would be unlikely to materialize. Although data 
are not yet available
regarding the recommendations of the IG offices, 
I have already gath-
ered data on all of the approximately 10,000 
discrete recommenda-
tions made by the GAO over the last fifteen 
years. The data cover
recommendations to the full range of federal government 
agencies,
from the Interior Department to the State Department. 
An analysis of
such data proves revealing. After the GAO 
makes recommendations
to an agency in its reports, its staff generally 
conducts follow-up inter-
views, additional investigations, document reviews, 
and issue queries
cretion is likely to yield a more defensible distribution 
of activity from a social welfare
perspective.
225 A search ran on October 26, 2006 on Westlaw's 
New York Times database for the
time period of January 2002 to January 2005 
using terms "'Inspector General' or
'GAO' or 'General Accounting Office' or 'Government 
Accountability Office'" re-
sulted in 1354 documents. The same search ran 
in Westlaw's United States Broadcast
Transcripts database resulted in 528 documents.
226 See supra note 225.
227 Id.
228 For example, the Department of Energy 
is mentioned only half as often (230
times) during the same period in broadcast transcripts; 
the Department of Transpor-
tation is mentioned only in 181 transcripts. 
Many other cabinet agencies are men-
tioned even less often.
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to the agency leadership. The audit agency then determines (on the
basis of these qualitative methods) whether a given recommendation
is implemented sometime during the next four years.229 Nonetheless,
about seventy-nine percent of recommendations made between Octo-
ber 6, 1989 and February 3, 2005 were implemented, perhaps in part
because of the potential media attention reports generate.
These implementation results must be interpreted with a mea-
sure of sagacity. The extent to which recommendations are adopted
may be endogenous to what the recommendation is-with simpler
ones (i.e., "write a report on the quality of the vehicle fleet for the
Secret Service") being implemented much more than complicated or
difficult ones ("reduce the extent to which the Secret Service works on
simple credit card fraud cases instead of critical infrastructure protec-
tion"). The adoption of recommendations is likely to be influenced
by political factors, such as the extent of division in appropriations
and authorizing subcommittees that oversee the agency in question.
It is likely too that departments with different bureaucratic structures,
institutional cultures, and particularly those with greater prestige,
have different reactions to the GAO recommendations. What makes
little sense is to reject the relevance of the audit bureaucracies, even if
they do not currently perform the sorts of audits that would generate
critical missing information about the use and abuse of executive
discretion.
B. Neither Do Legislators
Another possible setting where audits of executive discretion
could take place is in the legislature, where hearings to oversee the
bureaucracy are routine and legislators often complain loudly about
what agencies have done. As it turns out, most legislative oversight
activity has virtually nothing to do with systematically auditing
targeted discretion. In Part IV, I suggest some of the reasons why, as
with the audit bureaucracies, there seem to be so few audits of execu-
tive discretion. In what follows I want to provide a brief outline of
what legislative oversight activity tends to look like, and how this is
different from targeted discretion audits.
Legislators tend to prioritize the investigation and monitoring of
executive bureaucracies. They depend on oversight of the bureau-
cracy to achieve their goals. Soon after legislators arrive in Washing-
ton, many of them almost invariably find they can reap considerable
229 The agency (quite plausibly) assumes that if a recommendation is not imple-
mented within four years of being made, it probably will not be. Telephone Interview
with U.S. Gen. Accounting Office official, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 6, 2005).
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rewards from oversight activity. Oversight allows 
them to achieve de-
sired policy goals. It also lets them claim credit 
for making the gov-
ernment work more efficiently and effectively. 
As a consequence,
legislative oversight activity takes on a bewildering 
array of forms, in-
cluding-among others-formal committee 
and subcommittee hear-
ings, staff investigations of bureaucratic 
practices, direct contact
between a legislator and an agency's leadership, 
meetings with the
White House to enlist its support in pressing 
a bureaucracy into ser-
vice, and control of the appropriations process.
230 In the mid-1980s,
political scientists Matthew McCubbins 
and Thomas Schwartz intro-
duced what has become an incredibly durable 
framework for thinking
about legislative oversight of the bureaucracy.
23 1 Police patrol over-
sight involves legislators using their time, 
staff, and other resources to
engage in fairly constant vigilance of 
agency outputs-primarily
through staff investigations and committee hearings.
2 32 In contrast,
"fire alarm" oversight requires less constant 
attention from legislators
and their staff.2 33 Instead, legislators wait 
for "fire alarms" to be pul-
led by interest groups and portions of the 
public (occasionally, per-
haps when galvanized by media attention 
to some perceived
regulatory problem).234 To encourage this sort of 
activity, legislators
create procedures such as the federal 
Administrative Procedure Act
235
and the Freedom of Information Act
23 6 that let groups more easily
learn what's going on. Legislators rely 
on these parties to assist (im-
plicitly) in the oversight process. In short, fire alarms 
involve two re-
lated features: (1) reliance on interest groups 
(or, on occasion, a
politically engaged citizenry), and (2) episodic legislative 
responses to
instances where these groups express 
profound concern with some
aspect of bureaucratic activity.
Typically, legislators concerned with overseeing 
a bureaucracy
benefit substantially from fire alarm oversight. 
Whatever substantive
goals lawmakers may choose to pursue, 
the responses of organized
interests constitute valuable information 
to all but the most politically
secure legislators. But useful as it is from 
a narrow political perspec-
tive, fire alarm oversight is precisely the 
opposite of a random audit.
Unless legislators directly create a procedure 
to audit targeted discre-
230 SeeJAMES Q. WILSON, BuREAUCRACY 235-44 
(1989).
231 See Mathew McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
165, 166-68 (1984).
232 Id. at 166.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000 & Supp. IV 
2004).
236 Id. § 551-557.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tion (they have not so far), then fire alarms would virtually never in-
volve auditing, but rather sharp responses when problems have
already surfaced. Moreover, because targeted discretion often
(though not always) affects individuals or groups without ready access
to political power, fire alarm oversight would be particularly unlikely
to uncover problems. In contrast, police patrol methods are much
more consistent with the kind of audits I describe. Yet there is little
evidence from congressional testimony and hearings that this is the
sort of oversight that legislators do directly. In fact, what their public
statements seem to suggest is that if anyone is doing the kinds of au-
dits that reveal problems with government, it is the GAO and the IG
offices, not their own staff.2 3 7
This is not to say that congressional investigations lack any value
as vehicles for legislative oversight, or even as contributors to social
welfare. Congressional investigations often uncover important trends
or problems in bureaucratic activity, whether such investigations are
triggered by fire alarms or they arise from more pervasive police pa-
trol methods. While it is true that some forms of legislative control
can substitute for other mechanisms-like audits-two basic facts
might nonetheless make audits of executive discretion distinctive com-
pared to most of what legislatures, courts, and audit bureaucracies
currently undertake. First, legislators train their attention on what
catches their attention, not on a random sample of discretionary deci-
sions. Decisions that are not reviewed randomly (or through a strati-
fied random sample) tend to provide a biased sample. The results
skew the picture of bureaucratic activity that emerges, either because
of inherent characteristics in the sample or because the players being
"audited" strategically distort what they are doing in the decisions
more likely to be audited. Cases that are not reviewed at all do not
become the subject of any legislative, political, or public pressure.
Second, even when legislators and their staff choose to focus on a par-
ticular agency function, their oversight does not necessarily imply re-
view of specific decisions. As with the audit bureaucracies, oversight
hearings may focus on systemic issues such as an agency's policy pri-
orities or its handling of obvious crises. While staff may occasionally
review random samples of case files, this is not a routine component
of legislative hearings. From a prescriptive point of view, the results
may provide less explicit-and instead more ambiguous-findings,
which are harder to interpret and have less to say about whether gov-
ernment is performing effectively.
237 See, e.g., LIGHT, supra note 117, at 42.
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IV. WHY AUDITs FACE CONSTRAINTS
Judicial review is likely to do a poorjob of generating information
useful in the oversight of executive discretion, because routine execu-
tive branch discretionary decisions are often committed to agency dis-
cretion or reviewed at such a low level of stringency that there is little
or no meaningful chance of discovering problems. From a social wel-
fare perspective, supplementing judicial review with audits is valuable.
Audits could improve our ability to monitor bureaucracies at a reason-
able cost. Even acknowledging that legislators and executive branch
officials are often divided among themselves and from each other with
respect to what constitutes effective performance, audits may reduce
the risk of errors and bureaucratic failures that dominant political co-
alitions would like to prevent. Yet, audits of executive discretion
rarely happen. Why?
A. Political Actors Have Incentives to Undermine Audits
Two important sets of actors who have stakes in the work of the
executive branch may find that their goals cut against audits of execu-
tive discretion. Officials in the executive branch (and their allies in
the legislature) could institute an audit system internally. They could
support its implementation by the GAO and iG offices. Or they could
advocate for it in the legislature. The other set of players involves
those legislators (and their allies among organized interest groups)
who are generally opposed to expansive power in the executive
branch. 3 8
On rare occasions, formal audits of executive discretion develop a
political constituency within the executive branch.23 9 But this state of
affairs rarely occurs. Instead, other things being equal, executive
branch officials should react adversely to the prospect of parting with
discretion. 240 Discretion helps authorities carry out the functions that
238 Obviously there are still other players who matter. There may be moderate
legislators, for example, who have an interest in restraining abuses but fundamentally
accept the argument that intrusive judicial review may be too costly. I suspect both
that these actors could play a crucial and constructive role in promoting bureaucratic
changes that could contribute to improvements in how we oversee targeted discre-
tion. I also imagine that their numbers have been thinned by the increasing polariza-
tion of politics described by some recent work among political scientists. See Nolan
McCarty et al., Political Polarization and Income Inequality 5-11 (lan. 27, 2003) (on
file with author).
239 See supra Part I.D.1.
240 Sometimes things are not equal, as when leaders in the executive branch seem
to avoid responsibility for politically controversial functions holding little prospect of
generating a public reward, such as choosing a site for a nuclear waste dump.
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they are expected to, like keeping threatening people out of the coun-
try, prevailing in military operations abroad, or (at least some of the
time) keeping industrial workplaces safe. Discretion is also valuable
because it helps create certain impressions among superiors, legisla-
tors on appropriations committees, interest groups, and the public.
People respond to what they can see. Executive discretion lets govern-
ment officials (or their subordinates) choose what seems to be happen-
ing in a given area of the law. It stands to reason that losing some of
this power is not a welcome prospect. Neither is it desirable to face
the additional costs and the possibility of embarrassment that come
with more stringent audits. One might expect supporters of executive
power in the legislature to take a similar position.241 And some offi-
cials may simply crave power for its own sake. In short, other things
being equal, executive authorities and their allies should be expected
to seek more discretion, and less review. Unless those authorities have
reason to limit their flexibility in order to demonstrate their compe-
tence, 242 these players would probably prefer to avoid the embarrass-
ment of an audit that does not show them succeeding, and to retain
the benefits of the flexibility implied by that discretion.
The political viability of audits in the legislature is far from as-
sured. It depends on the extent to which legislators with divided goals
nonetheless believe that audits are worth the political price because
they can uncover errors of shared concern. Such coalitions are not
common, but neither are they impossible. In Congress, lawmakers
who differed sharply regarding the re-authorization of the Patriot
Act's investigative provisions nonetheless appeared to share an inter-
est in limiting the most egregious law enforcement abuses of certain
powers. 243 Such shared concerns help explain why the most recent
revision of the Act includes a rare audit provision applying to federal
law enforcement information requests using the Act's subpoena and
national security letter powers. 244
241 Unless, of course, their support of executive branch power is overwhelmed by
incentives to support (for example) legislative power.
242 For a discussion of the possibility that executive authorities could limit their
discretion as a means of sending a costly signal of their competence to the public, see
Cu~llar, supra note 139, at 57-58.
243 The legislators favoring the investigative provisions limit the risk that the au-
thority will be used in an embarrassing manner. The legislators opposed obtain a
partial victory valued by supporting constituencies and a means of generating infor-
mation that could change the course of future political debates about the relevant
legal provisions. See generally Bendor & Moe, supra note 173.
244 See Michael Sandier, Proposed Changes to the Anti-Terronsm Law, CONG. Q. WKLY.
REP., Dec. 26, 2005, at 3394.
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Audits fare less well where legislators find their political goals and
the production of information through audits to be in tension. Think
first of the legislators who tend to distrust what the executive branch is
doing. As noted earlier, legislators tend to lack incentives to audit
rather than to rely on police patrol methods. Even assuming that the
conditions are present to make these legislators want to use police
patrol methods instead of just waiting for an interest group to com-
plain, it is not obvious that the critics of executive power would want
to press for rigorous audits instead of simply polarizing the debate or
attempting to embarrass their political opponents. 245 A highly po-
larized debate has some benefits. It may galvanize support among cer-
tain constituencies. And opposition legislators (along with their allies
in external interest groups), enthralled by the prospect of an optimal
gamble, may prefer to win across the board than to support solutions
that no doubt seem to some like flimsy half-measures.
One can tell much the same story about advocacy organizations
outside government. If the issue is the treatment of enemy combat-
ants, for example, organizations such as Human Rights Watch may
strongly prefer a system where authorities implement the Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld decision 246 in a way that drastically cuts down on executive
discretion. Audits may seem like a poor alternative by comparison.
The choice between promoting audits (as a compromise) or pressing
for a more stringent standard of deference across the board thus de-
pends, as before, at least in part on the players' subjective assessment
of the probability that they will prevail in advocating for the across-
the-board standard. No doubt some determined advocates of more
stringent judicial review would ground their commitments on their
perception that courts are more politically insulated from legislative
or executive pressures than the audit bureaucracies. They may laud
courts' role in articulating the underlying nature of constitutional
commitments, or to directly impose reforms on public bureaucracies
through structural injunctions.247 In practice, these principled ratio-
nales may exacerbate a perception among critics of executive author-
ity that measures short of substantially more stringent judicial
supervision would yield little or no benefit.
245 Of course, audits may in fact embarrass the executive branch. That depends
on what the opponents think the audits will reveal. But whatever political benefits
audits can provide must be weighed against the opportunity costs that I discuss above.
246 Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
247 Because these observations raise valid concerns, the approach described here
is designed to work in tandem with, rather than to entirely supplement, judicial re-
view. See supra note 164.
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In short, while political coalitions supporting audits are not im-
possible to achieve, polarization among political advocates seeking
maximal advantage in their efforts to expand or limit judicial review
diminishes the extent of political interest in review mechanisms that
may be socially optimal. When players have more polarized views
about executive branch power, substantive policy and law, or both,
they probably have less to gain from investing in a compromise. Con-
ceptually, audits embody just such a compromise. Their architecture
necessarily resonates most with observers who simultaneously worry
about the drawbacks and benefits of greater review of executive discre-
tion, and least with those for whom such a syncretic exercise seems
unnecessary.
B. Institutional Inertia May Exaggerate the Value of Adjudication
To the extent that lawyers concerned with the exercise of discre-
tionary powers view themselves as zealous advocates on behalf of indi-
vidual clients, they may find little solace in a system that randomly
selects cases for review. Even observers without individual clients to
represent may naturally seek to focus attention on strategies to obtain
direct relief for aggrieved individuals. This conception is likely to ex-
ist in some tension with the notion that more can be learned through
reviewing fewer cases more thoroughly, even if the role of audits is to
supplement rather than replace such review. Observers emphasize
the value of adjudication as a recourse that should be available to, and
provide a remedy to, similarly situated parties. Judgments that do not
provide a remedy may strike some observers as ridiculous, and why
some scholars have persuasively shown how it makes little sense to
think about adjudication constitutional rights without "equilibrating"
that adjudicatory process with the remedies in question.2 4
Audits of executive discretion do not conform to these assump-
tions. In a narrow sense, they randomly privilege some people-
whose cases are selected for audits-and not others. They do not pro-
vide an obvious remedy, though it is certainly possible to forge a sys-
tern that makes remedial contributions by affecting the ordinary
course of judicial review. 249 They seem, as a result, to be ill-fitting
proxies for a persistent set of concerns that underlie the normative
case for less deferential adjudication. It is undoubtedly true that con-
stitutional provisions and values may require adjudication, and that
248 See DarylJ. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLU M. L.
REv. 857, 926 (1999).
249 See supra Part I.C.
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many deficiencies in adjudication are best remedied through changes
in adjudication.
Nonetheless, it seems equally clear that the prevailing conception
of adjudication could unduly dampen interest in audits. It promotes
the misleading sense that the value of audits are primarily seen where
an individual abuse (or mistake) is discovered, and corrected. In-
stead, the point of audits is to shed light on the entire system and how
it works. This has always been a concern of adjudication as well, but
perhaps it sometimes gets lost amidst the pressing rhetoric about pro-
tecting individual rights. Courts inclined to serve as a counterweight
can do so by crediting, during arbitrary and capricious or substantial
evidence review, agencies who incorporate credible audits of their de-
cisions, or who have been subject to such audits from the GAO and
Inspectors General offices recently. Although Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.250 and similar cases
preclude the full range of judicial elaboration of new procedures, it
does not strain the existing scope of review to suggest that courts
should attend to the internal and external procedures shaping the
extent to which a specific agency decision becomes arbitrary.2 51
Indeed, while Vermont Yankee may arguably limit courts' abilities
to directly impose audit requirements through expansive interpreta-
tions of the Administrative Procedure Act,252 audits seem directly ger-
mane to the familiar procedural due process balancing framework
ordinarily traced to Mathews v. Eldridge.253 By privileging the impor-
tance of accuracy-enhancing mechanisms, Eldridge implies that (where
protected interests are at stake) auditors' work could illuminate ques-
tions central to procedural due process analysis, such as the
probability that individuals or groups will suffer erroneous depriva-
tions under existing (as opposed to plaintiff-requested) procedures. 254
As they respond to conceptual and political objections, auditors (and
audit supporters) may thus find solid ground from which to empha-
250 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
251 Cf Bressman, supra note 2, at 555 (laying out a new theory for "examining
more directly the concern for arbitrariness").
252 Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (holding that courts are generally not free to
impose additional procedural requirements beyond those established by the APA).
253 424 U.S. 319, 323-28 (1976).
254 See id. at 334-35 (establishing a three-part test focusing on increasing accuracy
in administrative decisionmaking). Indeed, the frequent relative absence of an em-
pirical basis informing courts' determinations of what process is due in Eldridge-like
cases raises the question of how courts are currently making these determinations,
and how these might be best evaluated.
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size the potential intersections between the 
work of courts and
auditors.
C. Audit Bureaucracies Define Their Mandates Narrowly
Like all bureaucracies, the GAO and IG offices 
are also affected
by prevailing conceptions of their mission found 
among its internal
staff and leadership as well as external constituencies. 
Government
employees who have some flexibility to choose 
what to do and how to
do it tend to make choices reflecting-at least 
in part-their own
sense of the mission they are supposed to carry 
out. Those choices
can reinforce external perceptions, which in 
turn affect the work re-
ferred to the agency, the financial resources 
it receives, the people
who apply for jobs there, and the standards used to evaluate 
whether
the agency is succeeding in its work. Together 
these factors then com-
bine with the more prosaic political pressures 
both within and outside
the agency to shape its work environment.
Since the GAO and IG offices were created to 
serve as auditors, at
least one factor shaping the priorities of these 
bureaucracies is rooted
in organizational conceptions of how the role 
of an auditor should be
defined. The legislators who created these 
bureaucracies and their
successors may have long thought of these 
bureaucracies as a means
of detecting financial mismanagement or malfeasance. 
In the late
1970s, a GAO report commented on legislative 
plans to create IG of-
fices, and emphasized the urgent importance 
of auditing the finances
of government agencies. A scholarly commentator 
notes how this re-
port emphasized the tenor of the congressional 
discussion at the time:
Surveying every unit of the federal government, 
from whole agen-
cies to small program offices, GAO found that almost 
a third had
not had a financial audit since 1974. In unusually 
dramatic prose
on the front cover, the report announced: "One 
hundred and
thirty-three units, with annual funding in excess of 
$20 billion, told
GAO they had not received a financial audit during 
fiscal years 1974
through 1976.'1255
Politics has cemented the early focus on financial 
auditing and
procurement. 256 The audit bureaucracies' legislative 
overseers expect
them to demonstrate results, both in the sense 
of providing useful
vehicles for legislators to achieve their own strategic 
objectives and in
the more prosaic (and often overlapping) sense of detecting 
financial
improprieties that, where rectified, produce 
additional government
255 LIGHT, supra note 117, at 42 (quoting GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, FINANCIAL AU-
DITS IN FEDERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
AGENCIES (1978)).
256 Id. at 43-45.
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revenues. 257 In some ways, these constraints are a reflection of legisla-
tors' own aforementioned incentives. Legislators can nudge or even
force these agencies to undertake work the lawmakers desire. Given
these realities, it is not surprising that the audit bureaucracies so con-
sistently seem to embrace the fire alarm (and, to a more limited ex-
tent, the police patrol) approach associated with legislative oversight.
It proves difficult to find legislators or executive branch officials in
favor of waste, fraud, or (financial) abuse-though (particularly for
the GAO) it is certainly plausible to think that the content and aggres-
siveness of investigations targeting such problems would change de-
pending on the partisan composition of the legislature and executive
branch.258
On occasion, legislators may find audit bureaucracies useful to
generate publicity and promote policy objectives not related to ad-
vancing the ubiquitous mantra of eliminating waste, fraud, and
abuse. 259 Nonetheless, the legislative requests that drive a considera-
ble proportion of the GAO's work (and probably some of the work of
Inspectors Generals' offices) appear to reflect considerable resilience
in the extent to which the audit bureaucracies are viewed as experts in
investigating financial management: who spent what funds, why gov-
ernment vehicles were used for that trip, or why these employees were
asked to work on some questionable task. The same may be largely
true of managers and officials within the agencies themselves. Many
Inspectors General have a background in financial management or
accounting, as do a considerable proportion of staff at the GAO. 260
The audit bureaucracies are not entirely devoid of flexibility. It
would almost certainly prove misguided to see the political and orga-
nizational constraints on audit bureaucracies as insurmountable, or
their mission as entirely static. Even if they were, there is likely more
than just legislative pressure at work in determining the audit bureau-
cracies' agenda. Recurring disagreements among legislators almost
257 See, e.g., Seven Years of GPRA: Has the Results Act Provided Results? 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of the Hon. Pete Sessions), available at 2000 WL 1211285 ("GAO
has identified waste, fraud and abuse in government programs in amount of over
$800 Billion in the last 5 years.").
258 See, e.g., Anne Margaret Joseph, Political Appointees and Auditors of Politics 8
(May 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with author).
259 See LIGrT, supra note 117, at 44-45 (noting how some "member[s] of Con-
gress ... use ... IG input to frame issues for resolution. However, some members of
Congress have been less concerned with policy reform, using the IGs instead to score
short-term political successes.").
260 Id. at 84-85 (providing a table summarizing the backgrounds of IGs during the
Carter and Reagan adminisrations).
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certainly leave the audit bureaucracies 
with a measure of discretion.
26
'
Existing law already provides both the GAO and 
IG offices with broad
jurisdiction to audit executive discretion. Over the last few decades,
the audit bureaucracies have used that jurisdiction to generate (often
at congressional request)
262 the broad analyses of management prac-
tices and administrative priorities in public 
bureaucracies that, to-
gether with the aforementioned financial audits, 
constitute the bulk
of their work.
Still, change is unlikely to come easily. Whether 
the audit bu-
reaucracies assume the responsibility for auditing 
executive discretion
or a separate auditing authority is created, greater 
use of that jurisdic-
tion to effectively audit executive discretion depends 
in large measure
on demand from politically significant constituencies 
such as legisla-
tors and organized interest groups. Although 
change in their agendas
is not impossible, the preceding discussion shows 
it to be unlikely. If
political forces do not directly foster change, 
then the fate of audits
depends on the prospects for a degree of autonomy 
among the audit
bureaucracies themselves.
263 Despite appearances to the contrary, it is
neither necessary nor sufficient merely to enhance 
the formal inde-
pendence of the audit bureaucracies. As with 
minority-protecting in-
stitutional rules like the Senate filibuster, legal 
changes in an agency's
formal autonomy can invariably be undone 
unless the agency has
managed to enshrine the notion (among politically relevant 
elites or
261 See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 258, at 146 
("Auditors-whether in economic or
political institutions-choose what to observe 
and report in order to advance their
objectives.").
262 Id. at 179 (statutory duties); id. 181-82 (describing 
the areas of work of the
GAO); id. 209 (describing the high portion of reports requested 
by Congress in re-
cent decades).
263 Cf DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BuREAUCRATIC 
AUTONOMY 353 (2001)
(noting that "[b]ureacratic autonomy is politically forged"). 
The auditor's capacity to
undertake audits in a manner that embodies 
some principled standard therefore de-
pends on two critical factors. The first is whether 
the auditor manages to create a
sufficient degree of autonomy from the ordinary 
political pressures that might keep
the entity from being purely a creature of the 
legislature (or the executive). As Car-
penter notes, this tends to turn on the capacity 
of the agency to forge ties to poli-
cymaking elites that support its mission and 
favorable impressions among the mass
public (which suggests that, in a sense, it is these segments 
of the public guarding the
proverbial guardians). Id. at 353-54. The second is whether, 
given such autonomy,
the agency's leaders and staff sufficiently value 
their information-generating mission
to expend the necessary effort to generate material 
information. Cf Mariano-Floren-
tino Cu6llar, Refugee Security and the Organizational Logic 
of Legal Mandates, 38 GEO. J.
INT'L L. (forthcoming Nov. 2006).
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the larger public) that its autonomy should be protected.
264 The de-
velopment of public bureaucracies during the 
last century provides
ample evidence not only of agencies responding 
reflexively to political
demands, but also of agencies forging coalitions 
and manipulating
their political environment to become founts of major policy innova-
tion as the nation evolved.
26 5 At the Postal Service,
266 the Forest Ser-
vice, 267 and the Food and Drug Administration,
268 agency leaders
empowered by having successfully led transformations 
of staff selec-
tion and promotion paths became determined 
policy innovators by
cultivating support among professional 
elites and the mass public.
269
As the audit bureaucracies themselves evolve, their 
leaders may gradu-
ally awaken to the simple realization that they 
are capable of acquiring
some measure of autonomy along these lines, 
overcoming political
constraints by cultivating reputations for relative 
impartiality and tech-
nical competence. In the process, the audit bureaucracies 
remain ca-
pable of playing a unique and exceedingly valuable 
part in public life
by auditing executive discretion. Their greatest 
legacy may lie in
264 The example of independent electoral and 
redistricting commissions in other
countries is instructive. As Pildes notes, a number 
of democracies, including the
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand, use nonpartisan commissions
to draw political boundaries, where "politicians 
typically have no role." See Richard
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HxgRv. 
L. REV. 28, 78 n.211
(2004). Given that these commissions exist in the context 
of a democratic political
system, political actors may face electoral sanctions 
offsetting the advantages of inter-
fering with these commissions. See also Christopher 
Elmendorf, Representation Rein-
forcement Through Advisoy Commissions: The Case of Election Law, 80 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1366,
1432 (2005) ("The AC [Electoral Advisory Commission) 
that wants to enact a reform
that most legislators disfavor must establish 
a base of public support for its plan."). In
a similar sense, the formal legal autonomy 
of an agency such as the Federal Reserve
Board is best understood (in the absence of compelling 
theory and data to the con-
trary) as a reflection rather than a cause of political 
circumstances (sometimes criti-
cally shaped by the agency itself) promoting an agency's 
autonomy.
265 See CARPENTER, supra note 263 (providing a 
series of specific examples of
agency involvement in policymaking).
266 Id. at 123 (discussing the implementation of 
rural free delivery).
267 Id. at 282 (discussing vast changes within the Forest 
Service policy without con-
gressional approval).
268 Id. at 366 (discussing the Food and Drug Administration's 
"tremendous power
over the pharmaceutical industry").
269 See also Daniel Carpenter & Colin D. 
Moore, Robust Action and the Strategic Ambi-
guity in a Bureaucratic Cohort: FDA Officers and the Evolution 
of New Drug Regulations,
1950-1970, at 8 (Harvard Univ. Dep't of Gov't, Working 
Paper, 2006) ("If rulemaking
officials (or cohorts) are able to secure public 
legitimacy, are able to assemble
"strange bedfellows" coalitions behind their activities, and are able 
to capitalize upon
political opportunities, they can achieve 
the translation of divergent bureaucratic
goals into policy while bypassing entirely 
the legislative process.").
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steadily forging coalitions that would make it possible for them to play
that role.
CONCLUSION
The inexorable logic of executive discretion destines it to carry
risks as well as rewards. Pervasive discretion is what lets government
protect the environment, keep workers safe at industrial sites, and
fight military battles to protect its citizens. But history writes a damn-
ing indictment of discretion's abuse. It describes not only how
Nixon's IRS embarrassed his enemies, 270 or how Hoover's FBI
libelously fed speculation that slain civil rights workers were promiscu-
ous and mentally ill subversives, 271 but also how even the most deter-
mined and virtuous government officials fail to learn from their
mistakes when they don't know they have committed them. None of
this should be surprising given what is known about organizations, the
people who run them, and the complicated legal mandates entrusted
to them.
This Article considered three implications of these facts. First,
judicial review does not constrain the exercise of many forms of exec-
utive discretion that would nonetheless almost certainly benefit from
some external review. Regulatory and prosecutorial enforcement de-
cisions are among the most cogent examples. And we do next to
nothing to audit how that discretion is used, despite the presence of
compelling reasons to think that executive branch officials will have a
relentless tendency to frequently misuse that discretion. Because
some discretionary actions can signal competence and resolve to naive
observers among the mass public, executive officials may have an in-
centive to use their discretion to create favorable impressions. Some
officials or their employees may be far less subtle and engage in willful
misconduct that is unlikely to be detected. Even the most noble offi-
cials and organizations may face greater difficulties learning without
external mechanisms to systematically review and critique their work.
If additional resources to monitor high-discretion activities were avail-
able, it would be better from a social welfare perspective that we audit
instead of dividing them across an entire pool of cases. Indeed, the
mere presence of judicial review can foment the misleading impres-
sion that external review is succeeding in restraining abuse and ex-
cess, when in fact the probability of discovering problems may be
close to zero.
270 SeeJames L. Sundquist, Rejiections on Watergate: Lessons for Public Administration,
34 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 453, 456 (1974).
271 See REACHING FOR GLORY 245 (Michael R. Beschloss ed. 2001).
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Second, the conventional focus on traditional judicial review as
the preeminent means of supervising executive branch discretion fo-
ments another deceptive impression: that problems with imposing
more stringent judicial review mean executive discretion should be
relatively immune from formal review. When policymaking elites and
organized interests discuss the costs and benefits of executive discre-
tion, they tend to respond by fueling a familiar debate about the value
of greater judicial scrutiny of executive discretion. While this Article
does not dismiss the value of such greater scrutiny, particularly in the
provision of discrete remedies for aggrieved individuals and groups, it
offers an alternative to the polarized rhetoric of that debate. It effec-
tively says: even if one accepts that more stringent judicial review is
impossible, one should not therefore accept that the correct result is
to let the executive branch's wheels keep on spinning as they always
have. The key to that alternative is to recognize that a substantial di-
mension of the problems associated with policing executive discretion
involves information. Information is what impels the case for audits,
which in turn hold the promise of severing the connection between
the perceived costs of encroaching on discretion (both in terms of
direct review costs and in terms of interference with the valuable char-
acteristics of discretion) and the stringency of review. Indeed, govern-
ment powers to inspect, fine, prosecute, enforce, and detain may
rightly seem less threatening if their use can be effectively monitored
through audits or similar procedures.
On the other hand, it may seem at first as though audits would
only work if we lived in a world perfect enough to make them unnec-
essary in the first place. But the institutional design problems associ-
ated with auditing executive discretion call for an altogether subtler
diagnosis. Instead, four dynamics help explain that continuing em-
brace of judicial review, and the concomitant absence of activity audit-
ing targeted discretion. When lawyers and policymakers erase the
distinction between targeted discretion and broader policy judgments,
Lhey unduly restrict the scope of options available to help balance dis-
cretion's benefits and costs. Though not invariably, this state of affairs
often proves acceptable for presidential administrations, executive of-
ficials, and legislators supporting executive power: they will tend to be
perfectly satisfied allowing that power to evade more frequent review.
Somewhat counterintuitively, advocates of restraining that power may
also have incentives to oppose audit-like approaches as a matter of
political strategy, because it lets them sound the alarm to their sup-
porters while they fight for more aggressive review across the board.
That fight happens in a context permeated by persistent (yet ulti-
mately misleading) norms about the appropriate relationship between
20061
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adjudication and review of executive discretion, and similarly durable
conceptions of what existing auditors should do when they supervise
government agencies. Weakening these dynamics may require propi-
tious circumstances and Herculean feats of advocacy, but not the "per-
fect world" that would let us dispense with audits (or, indeed, judicial
review) altogether. In the course of navigating the imperfect world in
which law actually operates, the possibility of auditing executive dis-
cretion can be treated as a problem of institutional design. The dis-
cussion thus engendered can encompass questions about who should
audit, how large samples should be, what standard should be used, or
what should be the universe of cases to audit.
Third, a discussion of auditing serves a more immediate func-
tion-by demonstrating how arguments for broad discretion are often
radically underdeveloped. Cogent arguments in favor of limiting in-
terference with executive discretion should not herald the end of a
discussion, but its beginning. There remains the task of balancing
benefit against costs, and deciding on the institutional rules that
should govern the relationship between courts, agencies, audit bu-
reaucracies such as the GAO and Inspectors General, legislatures, and
external interests. As one viable approach to structuring those institu-
tional rules, audits help elucidate the conceptual murkiness of com-
mon arguments that favor broad executive discretion without
considering how to enhance mechanisms producing information
about executive branch performance. If executive discretion is to be
defended coherently, the case for it ought to transcend reflexive criti-
ques of judicial supervision, or veneration of a political process whose
very impact is contingent on institutional mechanisms to evaluate bu-
reaucratic performance.
It should be self-evident that the existence of broad discretion is
not synonymous with poor bureaucratic performance. When coupled
with an appropriate mix of external political constraints and intrinsic
personal motivations, such discretion can produce a harvest of valua-
ble activity from regulatory, criminal justice, and national security bu-
reaucracies. What borders on madness is to assume that executive
decisions of such profound importance-such as whose assets to
freeze, whom to indict, or against whom to enforce environmental
regulations-will routinely advance some defensible conception of so-
cietal interests when existing law lets them so readily elude scrutiny.
In effect, the challenge of calibrating the law's relationship to bureau-
cratic discretion constantly reiterates a set of complicated institutional
design questions about the use of public power. Arguments for execu-
tive power that ignore the subtleties of institutional design become
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nothing more than Trojan horses, with the contraband assumptions
hidden inside meriting the same careful scrutiny 
and critical judg-
ment that executive bureaucracies themselves deserve.
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